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TERMINATING THE "PASSIVE"





In the case of the smoker himself, it could plausibly... be argued
that the risks of smoking were somehow voluntarily incurred. In
the case of the passive smoker, that argument would be far harder
to sustain. Passive smokers do not themselves light up. They
merely breathe. You can voluntarily choose to do something only
if you can, realistically, choose not to do it; and no one can choose
not to breathe.'
INTRODUCTION
Within our federal scheme, the Congress is empowered to legis-
late for the welfare of society; regulatory agencies have the responsi-
bility to implement and elucidate the policy directives of these
congressional enactments. 2 The rudimentary directive of one of
these regulatory agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), is to diminish and, if possible, eliminate the human health
and ecological risks posed by the by-products of our complex soci-
ety.3 The task, however, is not clearly or even logically delineated.
* I would like to thank my mother, Lois Ann Horowitz, whose passionate and zealous
advocacy for the cause inspired and fueled this Comment.
1. R. GOODIN, No SMOKING, THE ETHICAL ISSUES 69 (1989).
2. See C. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.22, at 39 (1985) (explaining
that main source of administrative agency authority is derived from legislative branch). The
limits of agency power are found within its enabling statutes. l; see also Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988) (establishing federal agency adjudicative and
rule-making procedure and authority).
3. UNITED STATES ENvT'L. PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETrING PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11 (1990) [hereinafter REDUCING RISK]
(identifying methods for society to decrease consumption, lessen environmental risks, and
become more energy-efficient). The EPA has been described as a reactive agency, designed
with minimal flexibility to respond to specific environmental concerns pursuant to congres-
sional enactments. Id. at 3. As a result, many of the EPA's priorities do not reflect objective
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Regulatory priorities are dictated by often conflicting political, eco-
nomic, and scientific concerns that often obfuscate the ultimate
objectives of the health-based regulatory agency.4 The regulation
of environmental risks emanates from an eclectic process that seeks
to quantify various threats to human health and survival. 5 That pro-
cess, however, should not obscure risk realities. Legislative and reg-
ulatory risk abatement schemes should ensure that regulatory
efforts parallel risk realities and that similar risks are regulated anal-
ogously. EPA, however, recently discovered that its priorities, de-
termined in large part by its federal enabling statutes, are often
inconsistent with scientifically objective health risk conditions.0
This Comment examines one example of this regulatory paradox,
evaluations of the most serious environmental risks, but instead emanate largely from legisla-
tive responses to societal demand. Id at 12. Consequently, risks are regulated on an ad hoc
basis; little effort is expended to compare and contrast risks across different environmental
mediums so as to direct resources to the most significant risks. Id. at 3.
4. See generally I UNITED STATES ENVrL PROTECrION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, OVERVIEW REPORT 28-42 (1987)
[hereinafter UNFINISHED BUSINESS] (identifying and comparing relative risks of various envi-
ronmental dangers with public perception and relative degree of agency activity). The report
identifies indoor air pollution, of which Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) is a major com-
ponent, as a high risk problem with low agency response. Id. at 62.
EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB) responded to UNFINISHED BUSINESS in late 1990. See
REDUCING RISK, supra note 3, at 5-6 (describing goal Of UNFINISHED BUSINESS and SAB's eval-
uation of its findings). The SAB agreed with the findings presented in UNFINISHED BUSINESS,
recognizing that the EPA's regulatory priorities, largely the product of public opinion, are
inconsistent with real environmental risk. hId at 12. This dichotomy, as SAB described it, is
largely responsible for the regulatory paradoxes that exist today. Id. The SAB issued ten
recommendations designed to help reconcile EPA's mission with risk reality:
(1) EPA should target its environmental protection efforts on the basis of opportuni-
ties for the greatest risk reduction; (2) EPA should attach as much importance to
reducing ecological risk as it does to reducing human health risk; (3) EPA should
improve the data and analytical methodologies that support the assessment, compar-
ison, and reduction of different environmental risks; (4) EPA should reflect risk-
based priorities in its strategic planning processes; (5) EPA should reflect risk-based
priorities in its budget process; (6) EPA-and the nation as a whole-should make
greater use of all available tools to reduce risk; (7) EPA should emphasize pollution
prevention as the preferred option for reducing risk; (8) EPA should increase its
efforts to integrate environmental considerations into broader aspects of public pol-
icy in as fundamental a manner as are economic concerns; (9) EPA should work to
improve public understanding of environmental risks and train a professional
workforce to help reduce them; and (10) EPA should develop improved analytical
methods to value natural resources and to account for long-term environmental ef-
fects in its economic analysis.
Id at 6. EPA's budget allotted to address indoor air quality concerns such as ETS, radon,
asbestos, and lead comprises $11 million of a $4 billion overall budget. Bush Administration
Opposes Indoor Air Quality Legislation, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 70, at A-17 (Apr. 11,
1991).
5. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS 18-37 (1983) [hereinafter MANAGING THE PROCESS] (outlining risk
assessment and risk management processes within federal agencies and identifying divergent
and competing factors that dictate risk management).
6. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 95 (identifying indoor air pollution as area
of "high risk/low EPA effort" where risks and EPA's priorities diverge). The study identified
the divergence between public perception of risk and scientific reality as a major source of this
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air pollution from Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS). Many en-
vironmental health risks of similar or even lesser magnitude have
priority in the federal policy agenda because they stand at the fore-
front of public concern and do not engender political friction. 7
ETS, however, perhaps the third-leading cause of preventable
death,8 remains unregulated on a national scale. 9
Environmental Tobacco Smoke is composed of exhaled tobacco
smoke, known as secondhand smoke, and smoke emitted from burn-
ing tobacco products, known as sidestream smoke.10 EPA has con-
cluded that ETS causes lung cancer in nonsmokers and increases
the risk of respiratory illness in children, who are especially vulnera-
disparity. lId at 95-97; see also REDUCING RIsK, supra note 3, at 14 (identifying indoor air pollu-
tion as area warranting "major risk reduction efforts").
7. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 95-100 (recognizing that EPA priorities
and statutory authorities regulating environmental concerns are more reflective of public risk
perceptions than actual health risks). Examples include air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide
and total suspended particulates which, while vigorously regulated by the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7409 (1988), amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409
(Supp. 1991), were ranked 22 out of 26 in relative cancer risk. Id. at 32. The cancer incidence
from pesticide application are estimated to be approximately 100 cases annually, and from
active hazardous waste sites less than 100 cases annually. Id at 30.
8. Glantz & Parmley, Passive Smoking and Heart Disease: Epidemiology, Physiology, and Bio-
chemistry, 83 CIRCULATION 1, 10 (1991) (announcing results of study linking ETS with coronary
artery disease and ranking passive smoking third in preventable causes behind first-ranked
active smoking and second-ranked alcohol).
On April 18, 1991, an independent science advisory board of the EPA recommended that
EPA Administrator William Reilly adopt two ETS risk assessment reports concluding that
ETS is responsible for approximately 3800 lung cancer deaths annually, and therefore classify
ETS as a Class A carcinogen, a substance known to cause cancer in humans. EPA Board Says
Tobacco Smoke a Hazard That Should Be Regulated in the Workplace, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA)
No. 81, at A-8 (Apr. 26, 1991).
9. The potential for at least parochial regulation of ETS under present law exists. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 assigns OSHA the duty of ensuring that "each
employer... furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physi-
cal harm to his employees." UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS. A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GEN. 610, 613 (1989) [hereinafter 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS]. While OSHA sets standards for 24
airborne substances found in ETS, it fails to regulate ETS directly. Id. Broader authority for
regulation may exist under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. See Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991) (requiring EPA to establish national emis-
sion standards for hazardous air pollutants at level which "provides an ample margin of safety
to protect the public health"). Hazardous air pollutants are defined under the Clean Air Act
Amendments as those that are specifically delineated by Congress as such or those which the
Administrator of the EPA determines "may present, through inhalation or other routes of
exposure, a threat of adverse health effects (including ... substances which are known to be,
or may reasonably be anticipated to be, carcinogenic... )." 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(a)(6), (b)(2)
(Supp. 1991).
10. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INDOOR AIR FACTS No. 5: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL TOBACCO SMOKE 1-3 (1989) [hereinafter INDOOR AIR FACTS No. 5]. ETS contains more
than 4700 chemical compounds including carbon monoxide, nicotine, nitrogen oxides, for-
maldehyde, benzene, and arsenic. Id. These compounds are found to be highly toxic in
animal studies and are considered and treated as hazardous when emitted into the outdoor
environment by hazardous waste and chemical plants. Id.
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ble to secondhand smoke." In fact, 53,000 annual deaths in the
United States may be attributable to ETS. 12 While the tobacco in-
dustry disputes the scientific evidence,' 3 the findings strongly indi-
11. See Panel Callsfor Alert on Risks of Passive Smoke, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1991 at A4, col. 1
(discussing EPA science advisory board's endorsement of ETS risk assessments suggesting
ETS to be known cause of lung cancer). This finding by 16 independent science advisors to
EPA followed an EPA risk assessment analysis that designated passive smoke as a "known
human carcinogen," or "class A" human health threat, after concluding that ETS is responsi-
ble for an estimated 3800 lung cancer deaths annually, and is'the third most common cause of
lung cancer mortality after radon and direct smoking. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1990, at A24, col.
1. The report also associated ETS with "bronchitis, pneumonia, wheezing, and middle-ear
disease in children and that children of mothers who smoke have impaired lung growth and
development." IdL If labeled as a "class A" carcinogen, ETS would join asbestos, radon, and
benzene on a list of 15 such health risks. See also USA Today, Dec. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 2. The
chairman of the EPA's science advisory panel, Dr. Morton, said "it seemed to me that there is
a consensus that would make the case [that ETS is a known cause of cancer to nonsmokers]."
N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1990, at A24, col. 1; see generally INDOOR AIR FACTS No. 5, supra note 10, at
1-3 (presenting general information on the nature and impact of ETS); UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING. A RE-
PORT OF THE SURGEON GEN. 7 (1986) [hereinafter INVOLUNTARY SMOKING] (examining scientific
evidence of health effects of ETS and concluding that involuntary smoking is cause of lung
cancer in otherwise healthy nonsmokers and respiratory illness in children of smoking par-
ents); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE: MEASURING ExPo-
SURES AND ASSESSING HEALTH EFFECrs 9-12 (1986) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL] (estimating that risk of lung cancer is roughly 307o higher for nonsmoking spouses
of smokers than for nonsmoking spouses of nonsmokers and noting that children of smokers
have 20-80% higher chance of developing negative respiratory symptoms than children of
nonsmokers); N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1990, at 12CN, col. 3 (discussing medical findings show-
ing immature lung development of children increases susceptibility to ETS); Janerch,
Thompson, Varela, Greenwald, Chorost, Tucci, Zaman, Melamed, Kiely, & McKneally, Lung
Cancer and Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Household, 323 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 632, 633-34
(1990) (reporting results of study finding that household exposure to heavy smoking doubles
risk of lung cancer in children).
In June, 1991, the United States Department of Health and Human Services became the
first federal agency to acknowledge the health effects of ETS on workers. See generally NA-
TIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE IN THE
WORKPLACE, Current Intelligence Bulletin No. 54, at 12 (June 1991) [hereinafter ENVIRON-
MENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE]. In an official release, the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) stated that "[w]orkers should not be involuntarily
exposed to tobacco smoke." IdL Thus, NIOSH concluded, ETS exposure should be com-
pletely eliminated in the workplace. Id at 13. A NIOSH representative stated that "it is in-
controvertible that lETS] is carcinogenic." Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 139, at A15 (July
19, 1991).
12. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1991, at A22, col. I (discussing draft of EPA-sponsored report
concluding that ETS kills 53,000 people annually, 37,000 of which die from heart disease).
Dr. Stanton Glantz asserts that the heart disease risk from ETS is greater than lung cancer. Id.
at 1. Direct smoking caused an estimated 315,000 deaths in 1984. 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS,
supra note 9, at 131. An estimated 100,000 deaths a year are alcohol related. U.S.A. Today,
Apr. 23, 1991, at All, col. 3.
13. In response to the recent EPA scientific advisory findings recommending that ETS be
classified as a Class A carcinogen, a Tobacco Institute spokesman, Walker Merryman, stated
that "the [board's] conclusions on the risk assessment can only be described as irrational."
Job Safety, EPA Board Says Tobacco Smoke a Hazard That Should Be Regulated in the Workplace, Daily
Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 81, at A-8 (Apr. 26, 1991). Merryman further indicated that the
EPA has ignored three studies that weaken the link between ETS and lung cancer. Id.; see
Passive Smoke, Active Lobby; Tobacco Interests Set Sights on EPA Staff Study, Legal Times, Aug. 6,
1990, at 2 (discussing Tobacco Institute's efforts to discredit EPA's findings and public-rela-
tions campaign denying any link between ETS and cancer headed by Philip Morris, nation's
largest tobacco company); LAYARD, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Cancer: The Epidemiologic
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cate that the national legislative and regulatory bodies empowered
to protect the public from environmental health risks have clearly
ignored a serious and pervasive health hazard.
While a multitude of risks and effects of passive smoke are cited
and hypothesized, the foundation and premise of this Comment will
focus on the lung cancer risk of ETS. 14 The Comment discusses the
absence of national uniform ETS regulation and consequently pro-
poses a solution to assimilate the ETS health risk with current envi-
ronmental risk protection schemes. Part I examines the
environmental risk regulation process, recognizing society's role in
the quantification of risks and the paradoxical dichotomy between
risk perception and risk reality. Part II challenges these assump-
tions and the federal government's response to them. It attempts to
elucidate a concomitant paradox: the failure of Congress and fed-
eral agencies, particularly EPA, to protect society from certain risks
posing health threats similar or greater to those actively controlled.
Part III analyzes one such regulatory paradox, the health threat
posed by ETS, and compares this risk with other currently regulated
risks. Part IV considers potential avenues for terminating these in-
terrelated paradoxes. The Comment concludes with a recommen-
dation that only through both federal attempts to harmonize public
risk perception with risk reality and an amendment to existing air
pollution legislation can the ETS risk be mitigated and a more fo-
cused path towards a reconciliation of risk reality and risk control be
paved.
I. CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
A. The Quantification of Risk
The assessment of cancer risks is criticized as an amorphous and
imprecise process, 15 yet carcinogenic risk assessments remain the
Evidence, in ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPO-
SlUM-AT MCGILL UNIVERSITY 99-112 (D. Ecobichon &J. Wu, eds. 1990) [hereinafter LAYARD,
Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Cancer) (setting forth data from scientific symposium funded
by tobacco industry showing that link between ETS and lung cancer is weak and inconsistent).
14. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 8-11 (establishing substantial link be-
tween involuntary smoking and lung cancer deaths, respiratory disease, and cardiovascular
disease). The suspected effects of ETS exposure include common irritation of the eyes, nose
and throat, acute and chronic respiratory disease--especially in children of smokers, cardio-
vascular disease, and lung cancer. Id. For a clear delineation of the suspected health effects
of ETS exposure, see id. at 13-14; see also Reynolds, Extinguishing the Brushfires: Legal Limits on
the Smoking of Tobacco, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 438 (1984) (discussing physiological and emo-
tional impact of passive smoke on nonsmokers).
15. See REDUCING RISK, supra note 3, at 18 (encouraging EPA to improve its risk assess-
ment methodology); Thumbs on the Scales of Risk?, Wash. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at G3, col. 3
(arguing that assessment, regulation, and communication of environmental risks are inher-
ently biased and skewed); see also Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance
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guideposts for federal environmental regulatory activity.16 While
political, social, and economic realities inevitably preclude elimina-
tion of all risks, thresholds of acceptability have been identified.' 7
Society generally considers annual per capita fatal risks greater than
one in one-hundred (102) to be clearly unacceptable.18 Annual per
capita risks less than one in one-million (10.6) per year are generally
tacitly accepted and considered below the "societal threshold of risk
aversion."' 9 For risks between these two extremes, however, regu-
latory agencies engage in risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis
to determine the social value of regulation.20 Although EPA's risk-
Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY LJ. 1, 2 n.8 (1986) (assessing imprecision in
carcinogenic risk assessments). But see Significant Risk Decisions In Federal Regulatory Agencies,
ENvrL. REP. 1, 1 (Winter 1987) [hereinafter Significant Risk Decisions] (stating that even given
uncertainties of risk assessment process, it is "most powerful device available" to measure
health dangers and action needed for their abatement). The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 recognize that improvements in the assessment of human health risk may be necessary,
requiring the Administrator of EPA and the Surgeon General to study and report on risli
assessment methodology by November 15, 1996. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(1) (Supp. 1991).
16. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986) (promul-
gating guide for Agency evaluation of carcinogenic risks pursuant to EPA enabling statutes).
The guidelines are intended for use in assessing risks subject to regulation under EPA en-
abling statutes. Id. The guidelines adopt a "weight of the evidence" approach for classifying
risks. Id. at 33,996. Under this approach, carcinogenic data for suspected substances is evalu-
ated and used to place suspected carcinogens in risk classes, delineated from "Group A,"
"Carcinogenic to Humans" to "Group E," "Evidence of Non-Carcinogenicity for Humans."
Id. A substance is classified as a Group A carcinogen "when there is sufficient evidence from
epidemiological studies to support a causal association between exposure to the agents and
cancer." Id. at 34,000. See generally MANAGING THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at 11-14, 18-19
(discussing uncertainty in field of risk assessment and describing risk assessment process).
17. Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, in To BREATHE FREELY: RIsK, CONSENT, AND AIR 22
(M. Gibson ed. 1985) [hereinafter Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking]; see 45 Fed. Reg. 5235
(1980) (reporting testimony of physicist Dr. Richard Wilson who recommended Federal regu-
lation of fatal occupational risks between 102 and 10' annually).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 22-23; see 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044-45 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61)
(setting forth risk assessment guidelines for regulation of toxic air pollutants under section
112 of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988)). These guidelines seek to provide protection
from hazardous air pollutants by "(1) protecting the greatest number of persons possible to
an individual lifetime risk level no higher than approximately one in one million (106) and
(2) limiting to no higher than approximately one in ten thousand (10') the estimated risk that
a person living near a plant would have if he or she were exposed to the maximum pollutant
concentrations for 70 years." 1d; see also Cross, supra note 15, at 12-46 (comparing applica-
tion of significant risk ratios applied by various federal agencies including EPA, Consumer
Products Safety Commission, and OSHA). In assessing agency risk decisionmaking, Cross
concludes that the EPA considers a risk of one in one hundred for a small population, or one
in ten thousand for a group of hundreds of thousands as acceptable risk thresholds. Id. at 33.
The setting associated with risk exposure, in particular with regard to occupational choices, is
considered an important factor in the establishment of acceptable risk thresholds. Id. at 48-
49.
20. See Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1051-54
(1983) (discussing factors such as administrative complexity, public perception, and scientific
clarity of risks as significant in determining acceptable levels of risk); Graham, The Failure of
Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985
DUKE LJ. 100, 130-37 (identifying realities of cost-benefit concerns as inhibitive of zero-emis-
sion standards in regulation of hazardous air pollutants pursuant to section 112 of Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988)).
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regulating mandates are inconsistent in nature and scope2 ' and
often result in disparate and nonuniform risk regulation, 22 EPA gen-
erally attempts to regulate cancer risks of premature death which
are greater than an order of 1 X 10.6 per year or, calculated over an
average human lifetime.
23
21. Scroggia, Assessment of Toxic Risk is Key to Agency Regs, Legal Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at
22 (noting that EPA imposes regulations inconsistent with objective of protecting human
health). High risks may remain unregulated due to the cost of control and relatively smaller
risks may receive greater control due to economic and technical feasibility. Id.
22. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A) (1988) (requiring EPA to
issue maximum contaminant level goals (MCLGs) for any contaminant that "may have any
adverse effect on the health of persons and which [are] known or anticipated to occur in
public water systems"). MCLG standards are to ensure that "no known or anticipated adverse
effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety." Id.
§ 300g-I(b)(4). In determining the level of an MCLG for contaminants where there exists
"strong evidence [of carcinogenicity via ingestion] considering weight of evidence,
pharmacokinetics, and exposure," the EPA determined that only a zero-threshold level com-
plies with the statutory mandate. 56 Fed. Reg. 3532 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
141, 142, and 143). The EPA stated, however, that MCLGs are not enforceable standards,
but "goals based solely on health factors" and do not necessarily have to be measurable,
affordable, or achievable. Id. at 3534. The Safe Drinking Water Act, however, does require
that enforceable "maximum contaminant levels" (MCLs) be set for contaminants as close to
the MCLG as is "feasible." 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4) (1988). The EPA may consider eco-
nomic, technological, and other feasibility factors in setting MCLs. 56 Fed. Reg. 3556. The
EPA policy is to set MCLs for known carcinogens within a risk range of 10' to 106; risks
beyond this range are considered "not significant" and "safe and protective of public health."
Id. at 3547.
See also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1988) (authorizing EPA to develop and pub-
lish nonenforceable water quality criteria (WQC)). WQC must reflect "the latest scientific
knowledge" on the effects of pollutants on public health, aquatic life, and recreation. Id. As
nonenforceable guidelines, WQC have no regulatory impact and do not reflect economic or
technological feasibility considerations. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,319 (1980). The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) requires all pesticides sold and distributed in the
United States to be registered in accordance with standards to ensure that pesticides do not
cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." 7 U.S.C. § 136(c)(5) (1988). The
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) defines when a food is considered adulterated.
21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1988). The EPA may consider the necessity for the production of an
adequate, wholesome, and economic food supply in determining appropriate standards. 53
Fed. Reg. 41,104, 41,106 (1988). The EPA interprets the statutory language to allow for
performance of risk-benefit analysis in setting carcinogen tolerances. 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,104.
Under section 409 of the FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1988), the EPA is authorized to issue
food additive regulations if it finds that the use of the pesticide will be "safe" under the "gen-
eral safety clause." 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1988). The EPA interprets this clause to allow
cost-benefit analysis when issuing food additive regulations. 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,106. The
Delaney Clause, however, states that a food additive will not be considered "safe" if it causes
cancer. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1988). Although a plain reading of the language would man-
date a zero-risk standard, the EPA interpreted the Delaney Clause as containing an exception
for pesticides posing a de minimis risk. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,107, 41,112 (1988). Although de
minimis risks have not been defined, in practice the EPA has not applied the Delaney Clause to
additives posing lifetime cancer risks of premature death of 1 x 10' to 1 x 10
" . 53 Fed. Reg.
at 41,112.
23. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,998 (1986) (examin-
ing methods for calculating human cancer risk). Risks are characterized as a measure of ex-
cess lifetime cancer risk, or the excess number of cancers caused each year in the exposed
population. Id at 33,998-99; supra note 22 (reviewing established risk thresholds under vari-
ous EPA enabling statutes); infra notes 72-83 (examining risk regulation policy under Clean
Air Act).
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B. The Nature of Risk Assessment
The magnitude and acceptability of human health risks are often
subjectively evaluated by society. As a result, regulatory responses
often reflect these subjective assessments rather than objective sci-
entific reality.24 It is said that "[e]nvironmental regulation is about
risk. Public perception of risk relates closely to catastrophe and cri-
sis, and... [the people's representatives in government] reflect that
perception." 25 Risks that ensue from purely personal and voluntary
conduct, or are considered beyond the ability of societies or individ-
uals to control, are often accepted as unavoidable. 26 These volun-
tary or natural risks, while potentially severe, are often dismissed
and accepted as the costs associated with the by-products of life.27
For other risks, however, society perceives a need to take risk-aver-
sion action until the risk is reduced to an acceptable level or at least
to a threshold where the cost of further risk reduction outweighs the
perceived benefits. 28 The risks associated with less acceptable invol-
untary conduct, however, are frequently misperceived as being
24. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 95-97 (identifying disparity between envi-
ronmental risk reality and public perception). It is recognized, however, that the reality of a
representative democracy demands that societal preferences be given some deference when
engaging in risk decisionmaking. Cross, supra note 15, at 49.
25. Comment, Disclosing the Environmental Impact of Human Activities: How a Federal Pollution
Control Program Based on Individual Decision Making and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the
Environmental Goals of the 1970's in the 1990's, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 511 (1989) (quoting
Nathan, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Environmental Regulation, 8 ENVTL. L.O, NEWSL. 1, 1-2
(1987)).
26. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 20 (commenting on risks consid-
ered acceptable or unacceptable by society).
27. See Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REv. 19,40 (1986)
[hereinafter Sagoff, Federal Pollution Control Law] (asserting that actual magnitude of risk may
be less important than social, economic, and political context in which it arises). In fact, pop-
ular opposition to pollution risks arise not from an actual perception of quantitative risks, but
from inherent cultural enmity to "unnatural" impositions such as pollution. Id. at 41. As a
result, pollution, pesticide, and other toxic risks emanating from societal activity are perceived
as less acceptable than naturally-occurring risks of potentially greater magnitude. Id. at 40-
41.
28. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 20, 22 (evaluating thresholds of
risk acceptance and control). Risks perceived by society to be unacceptable are ripe for "risk-
aversion" action. Id. Optimally, such undesirable risks are then reduced to a level often dic-
tated by a cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 22. Cost-benefit analysis has been defined as a determi-
nation of"whether the reduction in risk of material health impairment is significant in light of
the costs of attaining that reduction." Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1146, 1159 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 506 (1981)). Much environmental legislation, however, is interpreted as rejecting cost-
benefit analysis in favor of action-forcing risk elimination requirements. See Schroeder, Rights
Against Risks, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 495, 505 (1986) (identifying society's aversion to utilitarian
cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation). Public opinion surveys also indicate public
rejections of cost-benefit analysis in environmental risk regulation. Id.
The use of cost-benefit analysis is most frequently challenged in cancer risk-aversion activity
because pursuant to a consensus of the scientific community, federal regulatory agencies con-
sider any level of exposure to a carcinogen a health risk. See Cross, supra note 15, at 3 (consid-
ering theory and reality of regulating cancer risks). But see National Resources Defense Council,
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greater than those associated with voluntary conduct; resultant leg-
islative and regulatory responses often reflect this reality.
29
Regulatory responses to environmental risks are selective and re-
sult from decisions made pursuant to priority-setting mechanisms.30
Regulation of cancer risks emanates from a risk assessment and risk
management process that defines the nature of environmental pro-
tection.31 Risk assessment is used by regulatory bodies to character-
ize the potential effect of environmental hazards on human health
and is the basis for hazardous substance regulation.3 2 Risk manage-
ment, on the other hand, is the process of documenting risks and
824 F.2d at 1152-54, 1163 (holding that section 112 of Clean Air Act does not "preclude
consideration of cost and technological feasibility" in setting toxic emission standards).
29. See Sagoff, Federal Pollution Control Law, supra note 27, at 41 (discussing societal ac-
ceptance of voluntary risk regardless of cost or benefit and societal aversion to "unnatural" or
involuntary risk); Doll and Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of
Cancer in the United States Today, 66J. OF THE NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1256 (1981) (Table 20)
(estimating percentage of cancer deaths attributable to avoidable and unavoidable risks). Em-
pirically, it is estimated that 65% of cancer deaths are caused by dietary and smoking habits.
Id. In contrast, 2%o of cancer deaths are attributable to pollution. Id.; see also Starr, Social
Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232, 1235 (1969) (stating that "we are loathe to
let others do unto us what we happily do to ourselves").
30. Several methods of agency priority setting have been identified. See Shapiro & Mc-
Garity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 20-
22 (1989) (identifying ad hoc management choices, quantitative risk assessment, numerical
scoring devices, and systematic selection by committee as alternative methods of priority set-
ting). Most agencies rely on a process that incorporates elements of an ad hoc and quantita-
tive listing approach rather than formal mechanisms for setting priorities. Id.
31. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,993 (1986)
(explaining that regulation of risk is bifurcated into risk assessment and risk management
components). Environmental risk assessment is described as the process of defining "the ad-
verse health consequences of exposure to toxic agents." Id. This is comprised of hazard
identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization. Id.
(citing MANAGING THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at 18). Risk assessment is distinguishable from
risk management. The latter describes the process of choosing a method of regulating the
identified risk. Id. This process must consider political, social, economic, and scientific data
to ensure prudent risk abatement. Id.
32. See Significant Risk Decisions, supra note 15, at 1; MANAGING THE PROCESS, supra note 5,
at 18 (discussing use of risk assessment to determine need of risk reduction for public health
threat). Risk assessment is generally considered to be a four-step process: (1) hazard identi-
fication, or the determination of whether a substance is causally linked to a health effect;
(2) dose-response assessment, or determination of the relation between exposure levels and
health effects; (3) exposure assessment, or determination of human exposure; and (4) risk
characterization, or description of the nature and magnitude of the risk. Public Citizen v.
Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing MANAGING THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at
3), cert. denied, Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Ass'n v. Public Citizen, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
Risk characterization involves quantifying the risk and presenting a framework to gauge the
significance of the risk. 51 Fed. Reg. 33,998 (1986). The process itself is controversial and
subject to uncertainty. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (recognizing inherent uncer-
tainty of risk assessment process); THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, Risk Assessment and Control
ix (1985) (summarizing use of risk assessment and its usefulness for government regulation).
"Virtually all elements of risk assessment are clouded with uncertainty.... The various scien-
tific disciplines involved in assessing risk are not sufficiently developed either to explain the
mechanisms by which particular causes produce particular effects... [and] the data needed to
analyze particular risks are usually not available." Id. at 5. But see Significant Risk Decisions,
supra note 15, at I (asserting that risk assessment, although uncertain, is best means available
to examine need for risk reduction of potentially hazardous materials).
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establishing the priorities of risk abatement activity."3 Perceptions
of risk, however, generally are determined not only by scientific
data, but also by social values and public acumen.3 4 As a result, reg-
ulatory choices and scientific disclosure may diverge.3 5 The current
absence of federal ETS regulation looms as a curious aberration and
amalgum when the fundamental nature of the passive smoking risk
is considered-exposure to ETS is involuntary. Since involuntary
risks are often perceived by society as least acceptable, federal re-
sponse would appear appropriate. Morever, the carcinogenic health
risk which it imposes are analogous to those currently deemed ap-
propriate for mitigation.36 ETS is, therefore, ripe for legislative and
regulatory activity.
37
II. IDENTIFYING REGULATORY PARADOXES
A. Public Misperception
Modern environmental risk abatement legislation, implemented
through pollution and substance use controls, reflect a societal be-
lief that the health risks posed by certain environmental constituents
demand affirmative remedial action.3 8 Between 1969 and 1978
Congress enacted seven major environmental pollution control stat-
33. See Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENvmT. L. REP. 10,190, 10,190-94 (1984)
(assessing problems inherent in risk assessment, communicating risk awareness, and deter-
mining that choices in risk management involve balancing certain risks against others in defin-
ing policy).
Implicit in the process of risk management are policy choices involving cost-benefit deter-
minations. Some environmentalists argue that the spirit of environmental law and societal
morality precludes such choices because human lives are at stake. See Doniger, The Gospel of
Risk Management. Should We Be Converted?, 14 ENvL. L. REP. 10,222, 10,222 (1984) (rejecting
Ruckelshaus' "choice" theory and stating that "[w]hen the Administrator urges the American
people to accept a philosophy of deliberately trading off lives and health against the economic
costs of pollution controls ... he is both disregarding the requirements of the Clean Air Act
and swimming against the strong tide of public opinion").
34. See Sagoff, On Markets for Risk, 41 MD. L. REV. 755, 761-64 (1982) (stating "[pleople
want to determine the background level of risk.... It does not matter how cost-beneficial
risks are; it is a question, rather of who controls them").
35. See supra notes 4, 6-7 and accompanying text (identifying disparities between EPA
risk regulatory efforts and health risk realities).
36. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (comparing ETS risk assessment with
existing EPA risk management policy).
37. See R. GoODIN,supra note 1, at 71 (1989) (discussing involuntary nature of ETS expo-
sure); INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 232-33 (citing survey that found 72% of non-
smokers favored separate smoking and nonsmoking work sections due to bad air quality). But
cf INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 233 (stating results of report that found no con-
nection between comfort complaints and office smoking conditions).
38. See Sagoff, Federal Pollution Control Law, supra note 27, at 24 (stating "[p]ollution con-
trol laws, in their most general terms, belong to a long tradition of humanitarian legislation
intended to ameliorate man's inhumanity to man"). Another way to view environmental legis-
lation is as a legislative determination to protect man from the offensive action of others. Id.
at 24-25.
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utes.3 9 A developing consensus, finding the human health and envi-
ronmental risks posed by the by-products of our modem
technological behavior unacceptable, inspired the passage of these
laws. These legislative efforts, however, were responsive primarily
to public sensitivities to environmental conditions and not environ-
mental risk realities, two elements which are often incongruous.
40
Consequently, our nation's current pollution control legislation,
reflects an historical, yet antiquated, perspective that the central
pollution threat to human health emanates from outdoor activity.
4 1
As a result, environmental protection legislation, such as the Clean
Air Act, has been directed at protection of outdoor environmental
conditions exclusively. 42 In recent years, however, much has been
learned, and even more questions raised, about the quality of the
ambient air in which we spend ninety percent of our time-the air of
the indoor environment. 43 The risks imposed by indoor air pollu-
tants, such as ETS, exceed those of many outdoor environmental
hazards, such as water contaminants, hazardous waste sites, and
many outdoor ambient air pollutants-risks currently regulated by
39. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86
Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988)); Toxic Substances Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1988)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)); Safe
Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10 (1988)); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988)); Noise Control Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918
(1988)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Star. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)); Clear Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7401-7671 (Supp. 1991)).
The success of these legislative initiatives and the regulatory efforts they authorized has
been debated. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT-A VIEW TOWARD
THE NINNTIES xli (1987) (stating "[p]roblems long recognized remain unsolved, and new ones
continually appear. . . . Past successes belie a growing incongruity between where the
problems are greater and where priorities ... are directed").
40. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (recognizing and discussing disparity).
41. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 19 (recognizing that while sec-
tion 112 has historically been applied to outdoor air, nothing in Act demands this
interpretation).
42. Id
43. Health Effects of Indoor Air Pollution: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Protection of the
Sen. Comm. on Env't and Public Works, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 42-43 (1987) [hereinafter Health
Effects] (statement of A.James Barnes, Deputy Administrator, EPA) (stating that although con-
cern over indoor air pollution is not new, national focus is primarily on outdoor air pollution).
This focus has changed with the increased public recognition of indoor air pollution and the
health risks it raises. Id. at 43. As people spend approximately 90% of their day indoors,
exposure to a pollutant indoors may lead to a "two to five times greater" risk than exposure to
the same pollutant outdoors. Id.
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EPA pursuant to federal legislative mandates.44
Several recent public health events placed the risks of ETS in
proper perspective and illuminated the significance of public per-
ception in the risk management scheme. In March, 1989, the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council (NRDC) reported that daminozide,
also known as Alar, a chemical used as a growth regulator on apples,
was a carcinogen. 45 The public reaction was immediate and intense,
and, under pressure from Congress and EPA, its primary manufac-
turer quickly halted domestic sales to alleviate exaggerated public
concern. 46 Later that year, it was rumored that Chilean grapes had
been contaminated with sodium cyanide. 47 The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) quickly responded to calm the public's fears.48
The paradox? A single cigarette, inhaled by smokers and non-
smokers alike, contains more than one hundred times as much cya-
nide and is in an even more dangerous chemical form. 49
In early 1990, benzene was discovered in several bottles of Perrier
water.50 Quickly, the entire national stock of Perrier was de-
stroyed.5 ' The FDA estimated that drinking a pint a day of benzene-
44. Id at 84-85 (testimony ofJohn D. Spengler, Ph.D., Harvard Univ.); see supra notes 21-
22 and accompanying text (citing relevant federal environmental legislation and implement-
ing regulations).
45. See Roberts, Pesticides and Kids, 243 SCIENCE 1280 (1989) (discussing NRDC's finding
that children may develop cancer in future due to exposure to Alar, as well as other pesti-
cides). The NRDC estimated that an excess of 6000 preschool children, out of a population of
22 million (one in 4200) would get cancer from exposure to Aar by the time they reached the
age of six. Id.
46. See Apple Chemical Being Removed From U.S. Market, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1989, at Al,
col. 2 (reporting Uniroyal Chemical Company's decision to terminate its sales of Afar). EPA
had earlier announced plans to ban the chemical used on five percent of the nation's red
apples. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1989, at Al, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at A20, col.
1 (discussing public hysteria resulting in discontinuance of domestic Afar use); Apple Panic
Overblown Reaction to Inadequate Data Critics Say, Chemical Marketing Rep., No. 12, at 9 (Mar.
20, 1989) (quotingJohn Rice, president of International Apple Institute as stating, "[tit is not
only irresponsible, but it is unforgivable that the NRDC has been able to create this level of
hysteria"). The public fear was exemplified by actress Meryl Streep, who called for the imme-
diate suspension of Alar. Id.
47. See The Limits of Risk, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1990, at A3, col. 3 (discussing incident,
where United States Embassy in Chile was warned that Chilean fruit had been injected with
Lyonide); Perrier Water with Benzene No Risk for Smokers-Nonsmokers Inhale More Benzene Than
They Can Drink, ASH SMOKING AND HEALTH REV. (ACTON ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, WASHING-
TON, D.C.), 1, 6 (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter Action on Smoking and Health] (noting FDA re-
sponse to rumored contamination of Chilean grapes).
48. See The Wall St.J., Nov. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (discussing Chilean grape scare and
subsequent FDA response). In response, the United States government banned the importa-
tion of Chilean fruit. The Limits of Risk, supra note 47, at A3, col. 3.
49. Action on Smoking and Health, supra note 47, at 6.
50. See Perrier Recalls Its Water in U.S. After Benzene Is Found in Bottles, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1990, at Al, col. 3 (reporting voluntary recall of Perrier mineral water after sample bottles
showed traces of benzene).
51. Perrier To Destroy World Stock After Benzene Find, Fin. Times Ltd., Feb. 15, 1990, at Al,
col. 3.
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contaminated Perrier would increase a consumer's lifetime risk of
cancer by about one in one million.5 2 The paradox? A nonsmoker
is likely to ingest more than ten thousand times more benzene from
sitting in a smoke-filled bar than from sipping a pint of Perrier.53
Similarly, asbestos exposure is actively regulated by EPA, yet the
relative risk for lung cancer due to passive smoking may be more
than one hundred times higher than the estimated risk from expo-
sure to chrysotile asbestos found in buildings containing asbestos.
54
The reality is inescapable; if ambient tobacco smoke were emitted
from an outdoor air polluting source, it too could be actively regu-
lated as a toxic pollutant and a carcinogen under existing laws. 55 In
fact, tobacco smoke contains every toxic air polluting substance de-
fined and regulated by EPA under the Clean Air Act.56 Public opin-
ion and fears, though, rather than facts, appear to presage
legislative and regulatory response; indoor air pollution apparently
has not engendered the requisite public concern.
In 1987, EPA issued the results of a study commissioned to evalu-
ate the disparities between the status of risk regulation and actual
risk reality.57 The results of the study confirmed what had been sus-
pected, "[r]isks and EPA's current program priorities do not always
match."58 The study concluded that EPA's priorities reflect public
52. N.Y. Times, supra note 50, at Al, col. 3.
53. Action on Smoking and Health, supra note 47, at 6. Most of the benzene in cigarettes
is in the sidestream smoke which enters the air and is breathed in by the nonsmoker. Id.
54. See Fielding & Phenow, Health Efects of Involuntary Smoking, 319 NEw ENG. J. OF MED.
1453, 1455 (1988) (comparing lung cancer risks from ETS and asbestos exposure); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2643 (1988) (authorizing EPA to promulgate regulations
effecting asbestos risk abatement in public school buildings).
55. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 19 (stating that Clean Air Act
historically is interpreted to apply only to outdoor air pollution). If ETS was an outdoor air
phenomenon, it would clearly fall within the Clean Air Act's interpretation of pollutants to be
regulated. Jd at 19-20. Regardless of this interpretation, the Clean Air Act does not prohibit
regulation of indoor air. Ide Section 112 of the Clean Air Act establishes a one in one million
annual per-capita risk (1 X 10 . ) as the threshold for acceptable risk. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991). The risk from ETS exposure has been documented at 1 X
10'. See infra notes 99-104 (reviewing ETS risk assessments).
56. 133 CONG. REC. 3328-29 (1987) (statement of Rep. Ritter).
57. See generally UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4 (reporting results of study on EPA's
risk-based programs). In an effort to implement efficiently its mission and properly focus its
priorities, the EPA commissioned a task force to evaluate 31 environmental problems in light
of four different types of risk: cancer risks, non-cancer health risks, ecological effects, and
welfare effects. Id. at xiii. But see REDUCING RISK, supra note 3, at 7 (recognizing importance
and shortfalls of UNFINISHED BUSINESS). The SAB criticized UNFINISHED BUSINESS for the
breadth of the environmental problems considered, stating that the ranking of both toxic and
non-toxic hazards made its assessment somewhat circumspect. Id. The SAB also criticized
the study's design for comparing what may be environmental noncommensurates, such as air
and water pollutants, and limiting the assessment to those risks that EPA is currently author-
ized to regulate. JI
58. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 95-96. The source of the disparity was consid-
ered explainable by public perception of the seriousness of environmental risks. Id. at 95.
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opinion more so than scientifically calculated risks and identified the
problem of indoor air pollution as a major area of high cancer risk,
low public awareness, and, consequently, inadequate EPA effort.5 9
B. Regulatory Inconsistencies
False perceptions of environmental risk and incongruous risk reg-
ulation approaches engender policy failures which ultimately under-
mine the potential for effective regulatory activity. Admittedly, the
risk-protection standards formulated by EPA pursuant to its en-
abling statutes are inexact and divergent.60 The complete failure to
regulate environmental hazards posing health risks analogous to
those which are actively and legitimately controlled, however, un-
dermines the potential for efficacious environmental protection.
While it is now firmly recognized and accepted that risk protection
does not command risk elimination, established thresholds of ac-
ceptability should be consistently applied to analogous pollution
constituents.61 The Federal Government's failure to do so, how-
ever, reflects an unacceptable regulatory paradox.
While a disparity between federal regulatory action and risk real-
ity may be, explained by public perception and socioeconomic
forces, these factors do not justify regulatory omission.62 As one
59. Id. at 96-97. Of course, as this study and others have observed, this divergence is not
necessarily completely problematic. Regulatory agencies are the product of representative
government and their actions must, to some extent, reflect the public will. See Cross, supra
note 15, at 49 (acknowledging frequent divergence between public risk perception and actual
risk and recognizing its role in risk decisionmaking). Public agencies that are not responsive
to public concern risk losing their legitimacy. Id.
In a consensus ranking of environmental problem areas on the basis of population cancer
risk, the risk from indoor air pollution, with ETS as the main component, ranked fourth out of
31 identified problem areas. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 28. This placed indoor air
pollution in the highest relative risk category. Id. In contrast, the study identified several high
public image risks as areas of "low risk/high EPA effort." Id. at 95. This list included active
hazardous waste disposal sites regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
inactive hazardous waste sites that fall under the purview of the Superfund legislation, and
chemical releases from storage tanks and municipal non-hazardous waste. Id.
60. See generally supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing non-uniformity of
EPA guidelines).
61. See Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces (BIF), 56 Fed.
Reg. 7134 (1991) (recognizing that regulation of individual air pollutants with well-under-
stood and analogous risks should be regulated consistently). In its promulgation of the BIF
rule, the EPA established a 10' risk threshold level for hazardous waste emissions emanating
from boilers and industrial furnaces. Id. Commentators challenged the regulation, arguing
that it was inconsistent with the risk-level of 10. established for regulation benzene emissions
pursuant to section 112 of the Clean Air Act. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text
(discussing implementation of section 112 of Clean Air Act). The EPA responded by distin-
guishing the emissions regulated under the BIF rule from the benzene standard by asserting
that while BIF emissions were multifarious and posed uncertain risks, the benzene regulation
involved a single pollutant posing well-documented health risks. 56 Fed. Reg. 7134 (1991).
62. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 96-100 (citing chemical waste disposal,
water pollution, chemical plant accidents, and outdoor air pollution as risks engendering high
1991] REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE 197
commentator noted, "just as the government cannot order every
thousandth citizen to be placed before a firing squad, it cannot
stand by as citizens are exposed to environmental hazards." 63 In
addition to public indifference, ignorance, and even tacit accept-
ance, the deficiency in public health risk protection is further fueled
by the political intimidation of interested parties such as the tobacco
lobby.64 While political and social realities perhaps preclude value-
free, scientifically objective decisionmaking, federal regulatory fail-
ure is illegitimate where the resultant public risk, from exposure to
carcinogens such as ETS, is inconsistent with the health-protective
premise of federal environmental legislation. 65
C. Establishing Legitimate and Consistent Standards: Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act
It has been argued that individuals possess a fundamental right to
be protected from the cancer causing conduct of others.66 Predict-
ably, the public demand for environmental health risk protection
parallels the dramatic increase in recognized cancer sources over
the last half century. 67 In fact, federal regulatory agencies, particu-
public concern, yet posing relatively low health risks). These risk areas are also those which
inspire high levels of EPA activity. Id.
63. Schroeder, supra note 28, at 507 (discussing public's right to be free from health
hazards posed by technology and pollution).
64. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 9-10 (discussing impact of to-
bacco lobby and cigarette industry on regulatory and legislative impasse concerning smoking
restrictions). The highly profitable tobacco industry is composed of six companies who are
represented by the Tobacco Institute. IL The stated goal of the Tobacco Institute is:
to preserve the ability of business to enter into the free marketplace, . . . to create a
climate in which our member companies can compete without unwarranted re-
straints. This means that we assist the nation's news media, its public policy setters,
and the public itself in separating the fact from fiction concerning smoking and
health. It means pointing out the gaps in scientific knowledge as well as ... over-
statements of what is known. It means emphasizing the danger of accepting fallacy
for fact in any scientific dispute before all information is available.
Id. at 10 (quoting Tobacco Inst., 1, 7 (Feb. 1982)); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text
(reviewing tobacco industry's challenge to recent ETS risk assessments).
65. See Sagoff, Federal Pollution Control Law, supra note 27, at 41-42 (assessing difference
between value-free and value-reflective pollution regulation). Conceivably, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 attempts to balance the two approaches by directing
federal agencies to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-
grated use of the natural and social sciences ... in planning and decisionmaking which may
have an impact on man's environment." IL- at 42 (quoting National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1982)); see also Comment, supra note 25, at 508-09 (citing NEPA as
reflection of congressional desire to achieve public good by means of social regulation as
opposed to traditional economic regulation).
66. See Schroeder, supra note 28, at 507 (quoting Gewirth, Human Rights and the Prevention
of Cancer, 17 AM. PHIL. Q. 117, 117 (1980)) (stating "[elvery person has a basic human right
not to have cancer inflicted on him by the actions of other persons").
67. See Davis & Magee, Cancer and Industrial Chemical Production, 206 SCIENCE 1356, 1357
(1979) (citing development of cures for diseases which previously caused premature death
and production of high-risk chemicals as two reasons for increase in cancer incidence).
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larly the EPA, acknowledge that the scientific uncertainties sur-
rounding the nature and causes of cancer demand that any exposure
to carcinogens be considered a health risk.68 Concomitantly, how-
ever, it has been recognized that such zero-threshold protection is
unrealistic in light of unavoidable and inevitable technological and
economic considerations. 69 Thus, visions of a pristine environment
and absolute protection from environmental risk factors may be fan-
tastical. Nonetheless, efforts to cleanse our environment and pro-
tect human health should consist of rational, consistent, and
therefore legitimate regulatory measures which thereby ensure ef-
fective environmental policy. 70 Pragmatically, this ideal could be
characterized as a governmental duty to regulate those risks which
exceed a consensual threshold of acceptability, above which society
can expect or demand consistent protection from health hazards im-
posing analogous risks.71
The dichotomy between carcinogen risk reality and regulatory
practicality which characterizes the federal carcinogen risk regula-
tion process is epitomized by the administrative history of section
112 of the Clean Air Act. 72 The provision was designed to be the
68. See EPA's Air Pollution Control Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1,232 (1983) (state-
ment ofWiliam RuckeIshaus, EPA Administrator) (stating that "EPA has generally in the past
concluded that in the absence of sound scientific evidence to the contrary, prudent public
health policy requires that we assume no threshold of effect for carcinogens").
69. See Guidelines on Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986) (stating
that cost considerations and technological advancements make risk elimination unreasona-
ble); infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of section 112 of Clean
Air Act).
70. See Schroeder, supra note 28, at 506 n.43 (citing other legislation protecting public
health as rational and consistent).
71. Id. (discussing regulation of chemicals, food, drugs, and hazardous waste); see also
infra note 102 and accompanying text (comparing lung cancer risks of ETS with cancer risks
imposed by regulated air pollutants such as benzene).
72. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 7412 (Supp. 1991)) (providing that hazardous air pollutants be reduced to an "am-
ple margin of safety to protect public health"); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988) (defining haz-
ardous air pollutant as "an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable
and which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious,
irreversible... illness"). Given the scientific concern that any level of carcinogen exposure
may impose a health risk, such a standard has been interpreted to mean a zero-exposure
threshold. 136 CONG. REC. S16,920, S16,925 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Durenburger); see Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986)
(establishing EPA's general risk assessment policy). EPA's reluctance to adopt a zero-emis-
sion standard was based upon the potential repercussions to the United States economy given
the technological infeasibility of complying with a zero-emission standard. Id. This was re-
flected by the fact that only eight pollutants were classified under section 112 as hazardous
pollutants in the 18 years following the passage of the Clean Air Act. Id.; see National Emis-
sion Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. § 61.01 (1990) (establishing standards
for asbestos, benzene, beryllium, inorganic arsenic, mercury, coke over emissions, ra-
dionuclides, and vinyl chloride).
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EPA's primary mechanism for regulating carcinogenic air pollu-
tants.7 3 A reading of the statute's language and the statistics verify-
ing the pervasiveness of human cancer suggest and support the
banning of such non-quantifiable cancer risks under a zero-thresh-
old theory.74 The EPA, however, in its interpretation of the provi-
sion, rejected such an approach and instead relied on "significant"
risk principles of regulation to determine proper standards of
control.
75
The District of Columbia Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency 7 6 sanctioned
this approach and elucidated the EPA's regulatory authority under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act. The court held that "safe" under
73. See Cross, supra note 15, at 22 (addressing EPA's implementation of Clean Air Act);
EPA, National Emission Standards for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Sub-
stances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,641 (1979) (establishing EPA procedures for
regulating carcinogenic risks). But see Graham, supra note 20, at 101 (perceiving regulatory
failure of section 112 as resulting from vagueness of statutory language).
74. Graham, supra note 20, at 116; see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1983-Part 2: Hearings on
S. 768 Before the Comm. on Env 't and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 51 (1983) (statement
of William D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator) (acknowledging that cancer is the central rea-
son for concern about implementations of section 112, and that "a firm base of public sup-
port" exists for control of airborne carcinogens); see also supra note 72 (providing statutory
language of section 112).
75. Graham, supra, note 20, at 110. The Supreme Court fully articulated the concept of
"significant" risk in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,
448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980) (plurality opinion). In Industrial Union Dep't, the Court invalidated
an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation of benzene, a known
carcinogen, without showing that the chemical's presence in the workplace posed a "signifi-
cant" risk to worker health. Id. The Court held that:
"safe" is not the equivalent of "risk-free." There are many activities that we engage
in every day-such as driving a car or even breathing city air-that entail some risk of
accident or material health impairment; nevertheless, few people would consider
these activities "unsafe." Similarly, a workplace can hardly be considered "unsafe"
unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm.
Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 642. The Court suggested that a lifetime occupational can-
cer risk of one in one thousand (10-3) could clearly be considered a significant risk level. Id-
Some risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable. If, for exam-
ple, the odds are one in one billion that a person will die from cancer by taking a
drink of chlorinated water, the risks clearly could not be considered significant. On
the other hand, if the odds are one in one thousand that regular inhalation of gaso-
line vapors containing 2%o benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well con-
sider the risk significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it.
Id. at 655; see Cross, supra note 15, at 7 (discussing congressional intent and Agency interpre-
tation of "margin of safety" language in Clean Air Act); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
13 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that finding of "significant risk" was appropriate standard for air pol-
lution regulation), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
Regulation of "significant risk" is explicit in other health protection statutes. The Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) requires the EPA Administrator to find that a "chemical sub-
stance or mixture presents . . . a significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human
beings from cancer .... in order to qualify for regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1988). By
the end of 1984, however, only four chemicals on the market since 1979 were regulated. J.
MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION 2 (1988). See supra note 22 (ex-
amining risk regulation policies under various environmental statutes).
76. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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section 112 meant "acceptable risk," not a complete elimination of
risk.77 The NRDC argued that given the Agency's inability to guar-
antee health protection from carcinogens, the EPA should be re-
quired to set a zero-threshold emission standard for vinyl chloride, a
known carcinogen, under section 112 of the Clean Air Act.7 8 The
Agency instead used cost and technological feasibility to determine
a safe level of exposure.7 9 After an evaluation of the legislative his-
tory of the section, the court rejected the NRDC's argument for a
zero-emission standard yet asserted that the Agency could not con-
sider cost and technological feasibility in determining a safe level of
exposure to toxic air pollutants until a safe or acceptable risk level
was achieved.80 Once "safety" was ensured, however, the Agency
could, in full compliance with section 112, use cost and technologi-
cal considerations in determining an "ample margin of safety."'"
Subsequent EPA regulatory action implementing section 112 re-
flects the holding in the National Resources Defense Council decision.8 2
The EPA now considers lifetime cancer risks greater than one in one
hundred thousand (10-') for large numbers of exposed people or
one in ten thousand (10" ) individual exposure risk, worthy of regu-
lation under section 112.83
77. National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(citing Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
78. Id at 1152 (discussing basis for challenge to EPA standard).
79. Id. at 1154-55 (explaining EPA Administrator's standard-setting rationale). The EPA
argued that section 112 permitted the Agency to limit emissions of non-threshold air pollu-
tants to the extent achievable by the best available control technology, where such level would
be below a demonstrated threshold of harm and the costs of further reducing emissions
would outweigh the benefits to human health. Id
80. Id. at 1166 (noting that Administrator must determine what level constitutes accepta-
ble risk).
81. Id. at 1165 (legitimizing use of cost considerations in "setting the standard at the
lowestfeasible level") (emphasis added).
82. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044
(1989) (establishing "EPA's policy for promulgation [of) National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for the protection of public health under section 112").
The guidelines purport to provide "maximum feasible protection against risks to health from
hazardous air pollutants by (1) protecting the greatest number of persons possible to an indi-
vidual lifetime risk level no higher than approximately one in one million (10"), and (2) limit-
ing to no higher than approximately one in ten thousand (10") the estimated risk that a
person living near a [toxic pollutant source] would have if he or she were exposed to the
maximum pollutant concentrations for 70 years." Id. at 38,045. The regulations follow the
two-step approach outlined in the National Resources Defense Council decision by allowing the
EPA to first ascertain an "acceptable health risk" on the basis of available health information
and then to find "an ample margin of safety" by considering both health and economic fac-
tors. Id.
83. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,045
(1989) (discussing NESHAP standards established under section 112). EPA stated that it
would estimate risk based on maximum individual risk and that a risk of no greater than 10"4
would be considered safe. See id- at 38,046 (noting that the presumptive 10" risk level "com-
ports with many previous health risk decisions by EPA"); see also Cross, supra note 15, at 29-30
(evaluating EPA's NESHAP for benzene emissions from coke by-product plants).
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The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 generally adopt the two-
stage risk regulation approach elucidated in National Resources Defense
Council. Under this method, EPA must apply the maximum achiev-
able control technology (MACT) available to reduce or eliminate
the risks imposed by the delineated hazardous air pollutants.
8 4 If
lifetime excess cancer risks greater than one in one million (10.6)
remain after applying MACT, the EPA Administrator is required to
set standards which provide an ample margin of safety to protect
public health.85 Costs and other factors may not be considered until
an "ample margin of safety" is achieved.
8 6
It is now clear that the regulation of hazardous air pollutants is
mandated until pollution is reduced to the minimum levels allowed
by technology. Even then, cancer risks exceeding a certain thresh-
old must be controlled.8 7 By delineating almost two-hundred differ-
ent hazardous air pollutants as worthy of control under section 112
of the Clean Air Act amendments, Congress acknowledges that the
degree of risk imposed by these pollutants justifies austere risk
management.
88
The regulatory battle reaches a pinnacle when voluntary human
behavior, such as tobacco smoking, begets involuntary human
health risks.89 It is clear that society tends to resent health risks em-
anating from profit motivations. 90 A significant regulatory chal-
lenge arises, however, with risks such as those from ETS, which,
unlike many presently regulated air pollutants, are not the by-prod-
ucts of activities dictated by personal profit motivations, such as in-
dustrial plant processes or waste production, but emanate instead
from individual physical desires, dependencies, and addictive
84. Clean Air Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (Supp. 1991). Section 112 of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments lists 189 new chemicals for EPA regulation. Id. The
process for regulation of non-threshold pollutants, or carcinogens, adopts the policy estab-
lished in National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This
policy was also promulgated in the NESHAP for benzene. National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (1989).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2) (Supp. 1991). This second-tier regulation provision repre-
sents a codification ofjudicial and regulatory interpretations of risk regulation requirements
from hazardous air pollutants under the original section 112 provisions. See 136 CONG. REC.
S16,932 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Durenburger).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991).
87. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing permissible risk thresholds
under Clean Air Act).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (Supp. 1991).
89. See R. GoODIN, supra note 1, at 69-73 (examining voluntariness of passive smoking
and concluding that ETS exposure is unnecessary by-product of human activity).
90. See Sagoff, On Markets for Risk, supra note 34, at 763 (assessing proclivity of public to
react negatively to risks emanating from self-serving interests of risk creator).
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habits.9 '
While risk abatement may be legitimately tempered by "signifi-
cant" risk thresholds, ETS presents cancer risks that are magnitudes
beyond these thresholds of societal and governmental acceptance.
9 2
Risk management without assessment may be overprotective and su-
perfluous, yet assessment without needed management is neglectful
and unacceptable. 9 3 The ETS lung cancer risk is involuntarily im-
posed by voluntary behavior and is left untempered by illegitimate
legislative and regulatory policy failures, rather than legitimate risk-
regulation considerations. This condition is unjustified and reflects
an indefensible policy paradox.
III. ETS RISK REALITIES
In October 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments
and Re-authorization Act (SARA); Title IV of SARA, the Radon Gas
and Indoor Air Quality Research Act, established the first congres-
sional mandate for a national indoor air research program. 94 While
this title hardly received the fanfare of its adjoining sections that re-
authorized the nation's troubled solid waste cleanup process, the
irony behind this reality cannot be ignored.95 This provision au-
thorized the EPA and other federal agencies to engage in research
and public information dissemination efforts in order to assess and
characterize the risks of indoor air pollution.
96
91. See R. GOODIN, supra note 1, at 7-15 (examining health risks and addictive properties
of smoking).
92. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (reviewing health risks of ETS).
93. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (comparing risk assessment with risk
management). The new section 112 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990 authorizes the
EPA, in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences, to examine the nature and effec-
tiveness of risk assessment in government and industry and evaluate its ability to accurately
reflect public health priorities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(o) (Supp. 1991).
94. Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality Research Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 403(e), 100 Stat. 1758 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (1990)).
95. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 95-97 (identifying regulation of hazardous
waste sites as example of inconsistencies between EPA regulatory priorities and environmen-
tal risk realities).
96. See 1 United States Envtl. Protection Agency, Report to Congress on Indoor Air
Quality 2 (1989) (outlining directive of Title IV of SARA). SARA Title IV directs EPA to:
(1) conduct research on all facets of the indoor air quality issue; (2) to disseminate
information on indoor air quality problems and solutions; (3) to establish two advi-
sory committees to assist EPA in carrying out the mandate of Title IV; and (4) to
submit two reports to Congress describing in the first report EPA's plans for imple-
menting Title IV and in the second report, describing the activities carried out under
Title IV and making whatever recommendations the Agency deems appropriate.
Id.; see also Health Effects of Indoor Air Pollution: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Envtl Protection of
the Senate Comm. on Env't and Public Works, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1987) (statement of A.
James Barnes, EPA Deputy Administrator) (identifying problem of indoor air pollution and
acknowledging that "for some pollutants, indoor exposures are two to five times greater than
outdoor exposures of the same pollutant"). Types of indoor air pollutants include biological
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Pursuant to its authority under Title IV of SARA, the EPA as-
sessed the ETS health risk and concluded that passive smoke causes
approximately 3800 lung cancer deaths per year.97 This risk assess-
ment followed numerous studies conducted over the past several
years linking ETS to cancer, heart disease, and serious illnesses
among children.98 An independent science advisory board of the
aerosols; formaldehyde, a probable carcinogenic gas; radon, a radioactive gas widely linked
with lung cancer; asbestos fibers, a cause of lung disease including mesothelioma and lung
cancer; nitrogen dioxide; household pesticides and solvents; and environmental tobacco
smoke. L at 92-93; see also 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 53 (citing ETS and radon
as indoor air pollutants which have been linked to lung cancer). For a complete overview of
the scientific data on indoor air pollution, see Indoor Air Quality Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 657
Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Ocean, and Water Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Public
Works, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1989).
97. See Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and
Respiratory Disorders in Children, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,874 (1990) (announcing availability of
EPA draft report assessing and quantifying deaths caused by ETS). The EPA also issued a
report entitled "Environmental Tobacco Smoke: A Guide to Workplace Smoking Policies."
See 55 Fed. Reg. at 25,873 (announcing availability of draft for public comment); see also supra
note 11 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's findings and recent confirmation of findings
by independent science advisory board); Altman, The Evidence Mounts on Passive Smoking, N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1990, § C (Science Times), at 1 (discussing health impacts of ETS and an-
nouncing release of risk assessment report). The EPA report represents the first official quan-
tification of fatalities attributable to ETS. IA The report concludes that lung cancer in adults
and increased respiratory infections in children of smokers can be attributed to passive smok-
ing. Id The risk estimates are based on 24 epidemiologic studies from eight countries and on
the two 1986 reports by the National Research Council and the Surgeon General. Id
In 1986, the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences and the
United States Surgeon General of the Public Health Service concluded that involuntary smok-
ing significantly increases the risk of lung cancer in adults. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 11, at 10-11; INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 26. In addition, both studies
agreed that ETS exposure substantially increases respiratory illness in children and may also
aggravate heart disease. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 16; INVOLUNTARY
SMOKING, supra note 11, at 41.
98. See Hirayama, Nonsmoking Wives of Heavy Smokers Have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer: A
Study from Japan, 282 BRrr. MED. J. 183-85 (1981) (reporting findings of first major study of
cancer risks from passive smoke). Test subjects were the nonsmoking wives of smoking men
in Japan. The women studied showed an increased lung cancer death rate of eight per
100,000 per year. Id.; Sandler, Comstock, & Chee, Heart Disease Mortality in Nonsmokers Living
with Smokers, 127 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 915, 922 (1988) (citing evidence of causal relationship
between ETS exposure and heart disease). But see INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 10-
I 1 (stating that although several studies have examined relationship between ETS exposure
and cardiovascular disease, no definitive causal relationship can be drawn). See also INVOLUN-
TARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 10 (linking acute and chronic respiratory illness among chil-
dren of parents who smoke). According to the United States Surgeon General, the prevalence
of respiratory symptoms and the incidence of respiratory infections are higher in children of
smoking parents. Ia Children of smoking parents have an increased frequency of bronchitis,
pneumonia, tracheitis, laryngitis, and other respiratory illnesses and diseases when compared
with children of nonsmokers. Id.; see UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 28 (identifying
ETS, derived from mainstream smoke and sidestream smoke, as main source of indoor air
health risk). Id. at 28. Mainstream smoke is inhaled by the smoker, filtered in the lungs, and
exhaled. Id. Sidestream smoke is the smoke emitted directly into the air from the lit end of
the tobacco product. Il Mainstream and sidestream smoke both contain oxides of nitrogen,
nicotine, carbon monoxide, and various carcinogens and non-carcinogens. Id.; see Fielding &
Phenow, Health Effects of Involuntary Smoking, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1452, 1452 (1988) (con-
cluding that mainstream and sidestream smoke are linked to cancer in nonsmokers); 25 YEARS
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EPA confirmed the assessment.99 The estimated 3800 deaths re-
cently announced by the EPA suggests an approximate annual per
capita lung cancer risk of one in ten thousand (10-4), a risk figure
which falls between the established federal thresholds of acceptable
and "significant" risk. 100
The reality of these findings is beyond dispute. 101 The ETS risk
significantly exceeds those environmental risks currently regulated
by our federal agencies and kills more people than all airborne pol-
lutants currently regulated by the EPA.10 2 Consequently, in accord-
ance with its guidelines for assessing the health risks of
environmental pollutants, the EPA now is expected to classify ETS
as a Group A carcinogen, an agent known to cause cancer in
humans. 0 3
OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 25 (finding connection between ETS and cancer). This report
concludes:
The absence of a threshold for respiratory carcinogenesis in active smoking, the
presence of the same carcinogens in mainstream and sidestream smoke, the demon-
strated uptake of tobacco smoke constituents by involuntary smokers, and the dem-
onstration of an increased lung cancer risk in some populations with exposure to
ETS leads to the conclusion that involuntary smoking is a cause of lung cancer.
Id. ETS contains over 4000 chemicals, at least 43 of which are known human or animal carcin-
ogens. INDOOR AIR FAcTs No. 5, supra note 10, at 1. EPA research has also shown that ETS is
the major source of mutagens indoors. Id. The effect of ETS on nonsmokers depends on the
duration of exposure. ki Studies suggest that passive smokers have a 347o greater chance of
contracting lung cancer than those not subjected to ETS. R. GOODIN, supra note 1, at 61. One
recent study estimated that passive smoking may be responsible for 53,000 deaths annually
among nonsmokers. Glantz & Parmley, supra note 8, at 38; see also Boston Herald, June 26,
1990, at 8, col. I (citing study which estimates 32,000 heart-related deaths and 18,000 deaths
from all cancers, including lung cancer). See generally INvoLuNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at
21-119 (reviewing scientific literature linking ETS to adverse health effects including lung
cancer).
99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing April 18, 1991 advisory board
recommendation that ETS be classified as Class A human carcinogen, substance known to
cause cancer in humans).
100. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 23 (arguing that estimated indi-
vidual risk level of 10." from passive smoke exposure is well within risk levels deemed ripe for
regulation); supra notes 21, 72-87 and accompanying text (discussing acceptable societal risk
and "significant" risk thresholds established by federal regulatory agencies).
101. Contra LAYARD, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Cancer, supra note 13, at 99-112 (chal-
lenging conclusions, endorsed by EPA, of ETS risk).
102. See R. GooDIN, supra note 1, at 61-62 (citing studies published by United States Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and Department of Health and Human Services). The approxi-
mately one in ten thousand annual per capita risk of cancer from ETS (10" ) is one hundred
times greater than the level of significant risk established pursuant to section 112 of the Clean
Air Act. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044
(1990) (establishing significant risk levels in promulgation of benzene standards); R. GOODIN,
supra note 1, at 63 (observing that ETS results in more deaths than do regulated air pollu-
tants). It is also one hundred times greater than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would
use to identify unacceptable cancer mortality risks from nuclear reactor accidents. Id. The
figure is ten thousand times greater than the "virtually safe" standard established by the Food
and Drug Administration for evaluating carcinogenetic residues in foods. Id. (citing Repace,
Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 23).
103. The science advisory board has recommended that ETS be classified as a Class A
carcinogen. Panel Callsfor Alert on Risks of Passive Smoke, L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1991, at A4, col.
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In the words of former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, "the
scientific case against involuntary smoking as a public health risk is
more than sufficient to justify appropriate remedial action, and the
goal of any remedial action must be to protect the nonsmoker from
environmental tobacco smoke."10 4 ETS is pervasive. It is in our
homes, in public conveyances, in public and private buildings, and
in the workplace. In all of these places, ETS is potentially deadly. It
is an involuntary, unnatural risk-the type of risk that generally in-
vokes the greatest fear-and is emitted from a readily identifiable
source, the smoker. 105 While a societal mandate to eliminate ETS
from the public arena and to encourage legislative response would
be consistent with the current approach to regulate risks of lesser
magnitude, ETS remains unregulated by the federal government.
10 6
IV. METHODS OF PROTECTION
A. Inadequate Judicial Relief
In light of the direct harmful effect of ETS on others and the un-
availability of effective voluntary control mechanisms, 0 7 a societal
consensus stating that there are no legal grounds for a "right to
1. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text (discussing recent findings of science advisory
board); see also EPA Guidelines for Estimating Exposures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,042 (1986) (charac-
terizing pollutant as Group A carcinogen only when there is sufficient evidence from epidemi-
ological studies to support finding that causal relationship exists between exposure to
chemical and cancer).
104. INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at xxi. Although the majority of studies re-
searching the link between ETS and lung cancer examine the effect on wives of smoking hus-
bands, the Surgeon General's report states that there is no reason to believe that the
increased risk of lung cancer is limited to home exposure. Id
105. But see R. TOLLIVER & R. WAGNER, SMOKING AND THE STATE: SOCIAL COSTS, RENT
SEEKING, AND PUBLIC PoLcY 76 (1987) (suggesting that since tobacco smoke is readily percep-
tible through sight and smell, "prolonged exposure to ETS cannot be anything but the result
of voluntary choice").
106. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (identifying disparity between actual risk and
regulatory activity by EPA). In 1983, 69% of adults believed that smokers should refrain from
smoking in their presence. 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 224. By 1987, 77% of
adults, comprised of 64% smokers and 84% nonsmokers, believed smokers should refrain
from smoking in front of others. Id
107. See 'Common Courtesy' and the Elimination of Passive Smoking, 262 J. Am. MED. Assoc.
2208, 2208 (1990) (arguing non-legal strategies are either unrealistic or cost-prohibitive).
Removal of tobacco smoke through ventilation to acceptable levels would be cost-prohibitive
and technologically unrealistic. Id Common courtesy, the tactic recommended by the To-
bacco Institute, whereby both nonsmokers and smokers are asked to respect each others
rights, has proven ineffective. Id. Forty-seven percent of adult smokers responding to the
1987 National Health Interview Survey of Cancer Epidemiology said that they smoke inside
public places without first asking others. Id. at 2208-09. This finding, and others, show that
the common courtesy approach by itself is unlikely to protect nonsmokers from ETS. See also
Repace, The Problem of Passive Smoking, 57 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 939, 939-41 (1981) (discuss-
ing impracticality of using ventilation to control exposure to ETS); R. GOODIN, supra note 1, at
82 (discussing inadequacy of ventilation systems and existing technology in protecting indi-
viduals from ETS exposure).
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smoke" seems appropriate.108 In fact, the absence of a right to
smoke in areas shared by nonsmokers has been equated with the
absence of a right to engage in Russian roulette. 10 9 Surgeon Gen-
eral Koop stated "the right of smokers to smoke ends where their
behavior affects the health and well-being of others." 110 Smokers
can control where and when they smoke; nonsmokers cannot
breathe with the same flexibility.
Some commentators suggest that the Constitution affords society
the right to breathe clean air.111 Others posit that "environmental
protection" amendments should be added to either the United
States Constitution or to state constitutions. 12 The courts, how-
ever, have refused to afford constitutional protection to those seek-
ing shelter from passive smoke in public places. 1 3  The
constitutionally-based arguments of those seeking protection from
ETS in the workplace also have been repudiated.' 14 Ironically, how-
ever, courts have been willing to consider ETS exposure in prisons
108. See generally BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND
POLICIES CONCERNING SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE (2d ed. 1987) (concluding that smokers
appear to have no legal grounds for claiming constitutional right to smoke in workplace).
Courts that have examined whether there is a legal right to smoke have consistently found no
such constitutional or statutory right: and have found smokers do not have a right to be
treated the same as nonsmokers. See Grusendorfv. Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th
Cir. 1987) (upholding Oklahoma fire department policy making continued work contingent
upon employee's agreement not to smoke even outside workplace).
109. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 27 (implying that individuals are
not empowered to expose others to unwarranted risk).
I10. INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at xii.
111. See A. BRODY & B. BRODY, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS 21, 87-88 (1977) (ar-
guing for constitutional right to breathe clean air). In 1911, the president of the Non-Smok-
ers' Protective League insisted that "[tihe right of each person to breathe and enjoy fresh and
pure air-air uncontaminated by unhealthy or disagreeable odors and fumes-is a constitu-
tional right, and cannot be taken away by legislatures or courts, much less by individuals
pursuing their own thoughtless or selfish indulgence." R. GooDIN, supra note 1, at 66.
112. See Reynolds, supra note 14, at 454 (proposing state or United States constitutional
amendment recognizing right to healthy environment); see also Comment, Where There's Smoke
There's Ire: The Search for Legal Paths to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 62, 72-75 (1976)
(reviewing suggested constitutional sources for right to be free from tobacco smoke).
113. See Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897, 898-99 (5th Cir.
1978) (rejecting constitutional protection claims of nonsmokers who alleged violations of
first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments due to physical harm and discomfort caused by
smokers while attending indoor stadium events), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
The chief obstacles for finding a fundamental right to a clean environment are described as
(1) the lack of an historical basis for recognizing such a right under the ninth or fourteenth
amendments; (2) the lack of decisional standards in the due process clause to aid a court in
determining whether environmental rights have been infringed; and (3) judicial lack of exper-
tise needed for the balancing required in deciding environmental issues. Comment, supra
note 112, at 74 (citing Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1972)).
114. See Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 181, 185 (D.D.C. 1978) (rejecting claims of first and fifth amendment violations
brought by nonsmoking federal employees seeking to restrict smoking in federal buildings);
Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350, 1350 (10th Cir. 1983) (rejecting first, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendment claims of nonsmoker seeking elimination of smoking in workplace).
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as a possible violation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause
of the eighth amendment. 15
Common law arguments to protect nonsmokers have been more
successful. In workplace environments, for example, courts have
recognized a common law right to a safe working environment, in-
cluding reasonable protection from ETS, and, thereby, have im-
posed affirmative regulatory requirements on employers to protect
workers from the hazard. 16 Also, smoke-sensitive employees have
qualified as disabled individuals under the Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, although judicial remedies have been denied where
employers have attempted to provide workers with relief." 7 In ad-
dition, courts have recognized nonsmoker's rights in disability re-
tirement suits s18 and worker's compensation suits. 119
115. Avery v. Powell, 695 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D.N.H. 1988). The court recognized that
evolving standards of decency in society, coupled with evidence of the hazards of tobacco
smoke, leads to the conclusion that involuntary exposure to ETS constitutes unfair punish-
ment. Id. at 636-40. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of an Off-Duty Smoking Ban for
Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 491, 506-07 (1990) (discussing
Avery and its implications); Note, Constitutional Law-Prisoners' Rights-Recognition That Involun-
tary Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke May Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Avery v.
Powell, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 363, 371-76 (1989) (analyzing the court's rationale in Avery).
116. See Shimp v. NewJersey Bell Tel., 145 NJ. Super. 516, 530-31, 368 A.2d 408,415-16
(Ch. Div. 1976) (holding employer has obligation to provide employees with safe working
conditions including reasonably adequate protection against ETS); Smith v. Western Elec.
Co., 643 S.W.2d 10, 13-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing lower court's dismissal of em-
ployee's petition seeking to prohibit employer from exposing him to tobacco smoke at work,
and applying Shimp to hold that employee has common law right to work in smoke-safe envi-
ronment). But see Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, 462 A.2d 10, 15 (D.C. 1983) (rejecting
worker's claim that common law imposes affirmative duty on employer to restrict workplace
smoking where worker failed to present any scientific evidence of harm from tobacco smoke
to nonsmokers in general). It seems unlikely that Gordon would be decided the same way
today, given the evidence that has developed since the case was heard on the dangers of ETS.
117. Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 89 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding plain-
tiff's smoke sensitivity was handicap, but denying judicial remedy on grounds that employer
made reasonable effort to accommodate handicap by creating separate smoking area and in-
stalling additional ventilation). See generally Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at
16-18 (reviewing ETS-related cases).
118. Pardodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding
court properly awarded disability retirement benefits to asthmatic with hypersensitivity to cig-
arette smoke when her Federal Government employer failed to provide suitable substitute
position in safe, smoke-free work environment).
119. McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 46 Wash. App. 125, 133, 730 P.2d
681, 686 (1986) (holding employee with ETS-induced chronic obstructive lung disease could
sue employer where injury was not covered by worker's compensation). In California, a
worker recently sued the California Compensation Insurance Fund for medical expenses re-
sulting from a heart attack he claims was induced by ETS exposure in a bar where he was
employed as a waiter. Heart Attack Claim May Boost Anti-Smoking Drive, The Gannett News Ser-
vice, Dec. 25, 1990. A proposed settlement has been reached between the insurance carrier
and the worker's lawyers. Id.
The general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988),
which imposes a duty on an employer to eliminate all foreseeable and preventable hazards in
the workplace, may provide workers another judicial remedy. See Action on Smoking and
Health, How to Deal with Workplace Smoking Problems (Sept. 1989) (suggesting general statutory
obligation to provide workers with safeguards against known health risks may be persuasive).
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While courts, in an effort to provide remedies to persons with
ETS-induced health problems, have applied alternative theories, no
judicial solution to the pervasive problem of ETS in the indoor envi-
ronment has developed. 120 As one court asserted, "the judicial
process ... is particularly ill-suited to solving problems of environ-
mental control."' 2 ' The court posited that such issues remain
within the purview of administrative and legislative bodies, 122 as the
judicial gap is due to the lack of nationally coordinated legislative
efforts protecting the general public from ETS. 123 Thus, uniform
judicial protection from the hazards of ETS must result from federal
legislative initiatives mandating regulatory response.
B. Legislative Prospects
1. Inadequacy ofjurisdiction-specific controls
As evidence of this involuntary health risk to the nonsmoker
proliferates, the public tolerance for breathing passive smoke
wanes. 124 Surveys illustrate that the public is offended by ETS, and
increasingly favors total smoking bans in many public places and
drastic restrictions in workplaces and restaurants. 125 Although the
root of this intolerance may be attributable more to general annoy-
ance than risk awareness, the nonsmoking public deserves strict pro-
tection from the offensive and potentially deadly smoke of others. 126
120. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17 (suggesting that judicial reluctance
to effectuate broad remedies may be due to rarity of ETS hypersensitivity throughout popula-
tion, social acceptance of smoking, and almost total lack of federal regulation of tobacco or
ETS).
121. Gordon v. Raven Sys. Research, 462 A.2d 10, 14 (D.C. 1983) (citing Tanner v.
Armco Steel, 340 F. Supp. 532, 536-37 (S.D. Tex. 1972)).
122. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 536 (considering need to balance divergent social interests
and apply scientific expertise in environmental regulatory issues as justification for judicial
abstinence).
123. See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 557 (documenting that government has
not regulated smoking in wide variety of public places).
124. See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 224 (documenting how population has
become increasingly opposed to ETS since 1964). In 1987, a Gallup survey showed that
"77% of adults (64% of smokers and 86% of nonsmokers) thought that smokers should not
smoke in front of others." Id Another 1987 survey, conducted for the American Medical
Association, found that 76% of its respondents, 49% of whom were smokers and 86% of
whom were nonsmokers, believed that nonsmokers had the right to a smoke-free environ-
ment. Id Only 10%, 25% of whom were smokers and 5% of whom were nonsmokers, felt
that smokers had the right to smoke anywhere. Id.
125. 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 224-39. A 1988 Gallup survey showed that
60% of respondents favored a total ban on smoking in public places. Id. at 233. A mere 16%
favored such a ban in 1978. Id at 232. A 1987 Gallup survey showed that 74% of adults felt
that separate smoking and nonsmoking sections should exist in restaurants and 17% felt
smoking should be banned completely. Id at 235. A 1985 Gallup poll showed that 87% of
adults thought that companies should have workplace smoking policies and 79% felt that
smokers should be separated from nonsmokers in the workplace. Id. at 232.
126. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (citing statistics of public perception of
rights of smokers in public areas).
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To date, no federal agency has exclusive jurisdiction over ensur-
ing clean air in all public indoor environments.127 As a result of this
federal regulatory gap, responsibility for protecting the public from
the perils of ETS has fallen upon state and local governments. The
resultant state laws generally include provisions protecting non-
smokers from workplace discrimination, providing leniency to non-
smokers in disagreements over smoking sections, and granting
localities broad power to enact more stringent ordinances.128 Local
ordinances are generally more restrictive than their state counter-
parts. 29 Local ordinances generally restrict or ban smoking in most
public places, including restaurants, and public and private work-
sites. 130 The courts sanction state and local efforts to protect the
public from a deadly health risk as legitimate exercises of state po-
lice power.' 3' While states and localities affirmatively acknowledge
the dangers of ETS by restricting smoking in various public areas,13 2
127. See Health Effects, supra note 43, at 93-94 (statement of Thomas Godar, M.D., Ameri-
can Lung Association) (describing state of current federal jurisdiction over indoor air pollu-
tion).
A variety of federal agencies have restricted authority. The EPA, under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988), has authority to control or limit
the manufacture of hazardous chemicals. Regulation of tobacco products, however, is explic-
itly proscribed under TSCA. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(iii) (1988). The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration is responsible, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 651 (1988), to ensure a healthful workplace. Although NIOSH, a component of
OSHA recently acknowledged the health effects of ETS on workers and announced plans to
commence gathering ETS information, OSHA has not interpreted the act as ensuring health-
ful air quality at the workplace. Health Effects, supra note 43, at 94. See ENVIRONMENTAL To-
BACCO SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 11-12 (encouraging workplace passive
smoker protection). The Department of Energy, while responsible for energy conservation in
homes and new buildings, has limited its jurisdiction to energy concerns. Id. The Consumer
Products Safety Commission, under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051
(1988), is charged with protecting the nation's consumers from unreasonable risks of injury,
which may include health effects associated with contaminant emissions that affect indoor air
quality. The Department of Health and Human Services, under the Public Health Services
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 242(b) (1988), conducts research and other activities related to the causes,
diagnosis, treatment, control, and prevention of disease. Finally, SARA creates federal juris-
diction for the research of indoor air problems, but not regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2).
128. See 25 YEARS Or PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 560 (reviewing typical provisions in re-
cently enacted state laws).
129. lId at 570.
130. It Approximately 400 local communities have enacted public place smoking restric-
tions. lid
131. See Rossie v. State Dep't of Revenue, 133 Wis. 2d 341, 350, 395 N.W.2d 801, 806-07
(Ct. App. 1986) (holding that statute banning smoking in public buildings except for desig-
nated smoking areas did not deny smoker equal protection of law); Alford v. Newport News,
220 Va. 584, 586, 260 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1979) (noting that ordinance limiting smoking in
restaurants was designed to protect nonsmoking public from toxic effect of smoke and was
within legislative domain).
132. See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 557-60, 69-72 (reviewing scope of current
state and local smoking restrictions). As awareness of the health hazards of smoking and
passive smoking grew during the 1960s and 1970s, state and local laws, originally enacted as
fire prevention measures, developed into health and safety legislation. Id. at 557-58. Be-
tween 1970 and 1979, 24 states enacted smoking restrictions, lId at 558. Most notable was
210 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:183
ordinances are divergent and inconsistent in scope.'33 Consistent
protection from ETS exposure, therefore, is not guaranteed across
state or local borders.
2. The passive federal effort
While the Federal Government has not acted on a national scale
to regulate general exposure to ETS, it has imposed limited restric-
tions in the federal workplace and in some public facilities. In 1986,
the General Services Administration (GSA) issued regulations re-
stricting individuals from smoking in GSA controlled buildings.'
3 4
The regulations recognize the nonsmokers' right and need for pro-
tection from the offensive smoke of others. The legislation, how-
ever, is limited in scope and, arguably, inadequate because it
permits smoking in areas shared by both smokers and non-
smokers.' 3 5 The Secretary of Health and Human Services, recog-
the comprehensive Minnesota Clean Air Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.414 (West Supp. 1988),
which became a benchmark for other state laws. 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 558.
This legislation limited smoking in public places, including private and public worksites, to
designated smoking areas. Id. By 1985, 41 states and the District of Columbia had smoking
bans regulating smoking in at least one public place. Id. at 569. Following the 1986 reports
of the National Research Council and the Surgeon General on the health impacts of ETS, 20
states enacted new public smoking restrictions. lId By 1987, smoking was restricted in at least
one public place in 42 states and the District of Columbia. Id. As ofJanuary 1988, over 82%
of the United States population resided in states that restricted smoking in at least one public
place. Id.; see also INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 266-77 (providing comprehensive
overview of state and local smoking restrictions); Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers
and Nonsmokers: The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444, 450-59 (1980)
(reviewing Minnesota law and similar statutes).
133. See A. BRODY & B. BRODY, supra note 111, at 106 (recognizing disparity in state and
local legislation and describing it as of "patchwork quality"). As a possible solution, one
authority proposed a model state smoking statute. Ide at 107-16; see also Reynolds, supra note
14, at 446-47 (citing inconsistencies in state and local statutes); see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
913 (1989 and Supp. 1991) (requiring private and public employers to designate specific
smoking areas in workplaces); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1230.1 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (control-
ling smoking in certain public places, meetings, and work areas); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 1399-0 (McKinney 1990) (prohibiting smoking in specific public areas); CAL. HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE § 25948 (West Supp. 1990) (eliminating smoking on public transportation
vehicles).
134. 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.105-3 (1990). The preamble to the GSA regulations recognizes
the adverse effects of passive smoke and justifies the regulations as necessary to protect the
health of nonsmoking federal employees and public building visitors. 51 Fed. Reg. 44,258
(1986) (codified at 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-120). It identifies their "right not to be exposed involun-
tarily to secondhand tobacco smoke at the Federal work site." Id. The purpose of the regula-
tions is to provide a "reasonably smoke-free environment in certain areas" of GSA-
administered buildings. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PASSIVE SMOKING IN THE
WORKPLACE: SELECTED ISSUES 31 (1986) [hereinafter PASSIVE SMOKING].
The GSA controlled 34% of all federal office space in 1983. Id. at 30. The Department of
Defense and the Postal Service controlled the remainder of federal office space. Id. In addi-
tion, the Veterans Administration (VA) developed smoking regulations for 172 VA medical
centers and 225 clinics. Id.
135. See PASSIVE SMOKING, supra note 134, at 32 (explaining that smoking in open office
areas is point of contention). The regulations acknowledge involuntary smoking as a health
hazard to nonsmokers. It at 31-32. They prohibit smoking in auditoriums, classrooms, con-
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nizing the deficiency of existing regulations, recently recommended
that President Bush issue an order banning smoking in all federal
executive branch agencies and buildings.13 6 The Department of De-
fense, Postal Service, and Veterans Administration have also imple-
mented workplace smoking restrictions. 37 While such restrictions
indicate a growing awareness within the Federal Government of the
health dangers of ETS, they also illustrate the deficient status of cur-
rent efforts. They acknowledge the problem, but the limited scope
of these restrictions fails to confront the national health danger.
The domestic airline flight smoking ban is illustrative and charac-
teristic. As of February 25, 1989, pursuant to an act of Congress,
smoking is prohibited on over ninety-nine percent of all United
States domestic airline flights.' 3 8 The action came in response to
evidence that continued exposure to ETS on flights scheduled for
two hours or more would be fatal to approximately 15 cabin crew
members and between 42 and 440 passengers per year.' 3 9 Studies
performed for the Department of Transportation concluded that,
given the hazards of ETS exposure, a total ban on smoking would
provide the greatest benefit at the least cost.1 40 In smoking sec-
tions, the level of ETS exposure exceeded the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards' (NAAQS) primary and secondary air pollution
levels, which, if outdoors, would generate an air pollution emer-
gency. 141 The studies indicated that similar or greater risks exist for
international flights, but under pressure from the tobacco industry,
ference rooms, elevators, medical facilities, libraries, and hazardous areas. Id. at 32. In addi-
tion, the regulations ban smoking in open office space shared by smokers and nonsmokers,
except when the space is large enough and sufficiently ventilated to limit involuntary exposure
to ETS. Id€ at 34. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 12-13 (discussing Surgeon
General's determination that mere separation of smokers and nonsmokers in same airspace is
inadequate to protect nonsmokers from hazards of ETS).
136. Sullivan Proposes Executive Branch Smoking Ban, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1991, at A10, col.
1. Unlike existing regulations, the proposal of Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, would not allow any designated smoking areas in such buildings. Id. The
order, however, would not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of the government. Id.
137. See PASSIVE SMOKING, supra note 134, at 33-38 (summarizing workplace smoking re-
strictions at Department of Defense, Postal Service, and Veterans Administration which seek
to separate smoker and nonsmoker by establishing designated smoking areas in buildings).
138. Department of Transp. and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1989, 101 Pub.
L. No. 101-164, 103 Stat. 1069 (1989). This statute permanently amended 404(d)(1) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1374(d)(1) (1988).
139. The New Airline Smoking Ban: New Report Documents Deadly Problem, ASH SMOKING AND
HEALTH REV. (Action on Smoking and Health, Washington, D.C.), at 3 (Feb. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter The New Airline Smoking Ban). These figures were based on studies showing that 120 to 150,
2.7 to 8.3, and 0.8 to 1.1 excess deaths per million of cabin crew members, business passen-
gers, and casual passengers, respectively, would result annually. Id
140. It
141. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988) (authorizing establishment of National Ambient Air
Quality Standards).
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Congress refused to extend the regulations to overseas flights. 142
The courts affirmed these federal actions as legitimate governmen-
tal efforts to protect the public health.' 43
Less successful congressional efforts over the past five years re-
flect at least an awareness of the need to examine the indoor air
pollution dilemma in general and the ETS danger in particular.
Several bills, none of which have become law, proposed to restrict
smoking to designated areas in all United States government build-
ings. 144 Another defeated measure attempted to restrict smoking
on all domestic, interstate public conveyances. 145 One recent bill,
however, explicitly acknowledged the ETS risk reality and called for
an affirmative legislative response.146 Perhaps inspired by the EPA's
recent draft reports, this legislation would have cancelled the to-
bacco products exemption under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), and specifically authorized the EPA to regulate tobacco for
what it is, a high-risk toxic substance.' 47 Most federal legislative
acknowledgements of the broad indoor air pollution problem, how-
ever, merely encourage federal agency research of the problem; the
most recent legislative proposal, however, does contain a regulatory
142. The New Airline Smoking Ban, supra note 139, at 3.
143. See Diefenthal v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) did not exceed its statutory authority by requiring nonsmok-
ing sections on airlines); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d
1209, 1212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding CAB authority to regulate smoking on airlines
pursuant to Federal Aviation Act language requiring CAB to provide "adequate service");
National Ass'n of Motor Bus Owners v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 408, 417 (D.D.C. 1974)
(upholding Interstate Commerce Commission regulation prohibiting smoking in 80%5 of seats
on buses traveling in interstate commerce).
144. Non-Smokers' Rights Act of 1985, S. 1440, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Non-Smok-
ers' Rights Act of 1986, H.R. 4546, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Nonsmokers' Health Protec-
tion Act of 1987, H.R. 1008, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
145. See Public Protection from Passive Smoke Act, S. 655, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(proposing to amend Public Health Service Act to require certification from public convey-
ances that passengers are not involuntarily subjected to passive smoke).
146. See The Equal Treatment for Cigarettes Act of 1990, H.R. 5208, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) (proposing to amend Toxic Substances Control Act to give EPA authority to
regulate tobacco products). The sponsor, former Congressman Thomas Luken of Ohio, ar-
gued for the amendment by referring to the 1986 Surgeon General's report on passive smok-
ing. 136 CONG. REC. E2223-24 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statement of Rep. Luken). He
stated "[t]here is no reason why the tobacco companies should continue to be shielded from a
law that regulates all other chemical substances and mixtures." Id. at E2223. "[U]nder cur-
rent law, EPA can do nothing about this dangerous product." Id The Act would not prohibit
the manufacturing or marketing of tobacco products, but would provide the Federal Govern-
ment with the capacity to regulate the use of tobacco as a toxic substance. Id Tobacco prod-
ucts are currently exempt from EPA regulation under TSCA. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(iii)
(1988).
147. H.R. 5208, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See generally O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of
Safety Regulation: The Case for Improving Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 215, 236-39
(1989) (citing TSCA as regulatory option for regulation of tobacco products given law's pur-
pose of mitigating adverse human health effects from exposure to toxic substances).
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component.148
Although the texts and legislative histories of recently proposed
bills reflect an informed recognition of the risks created by passive
smoke in particular and indoor air pollution in general, the narrow
scope of the efforts and their failure to become law reflect the cur-
rent federal aversion to nationwide regulation of this glaring health
risk. Political pressure by the tobacco industry, which would bear
the greatest economic loss from large-scale smoking restrictions, is a
central reason for this federal legislative stagnation.149 The per-
sonal and historically acceptable nature of the risk source and resul-
tant societal misperception of the risk presents another significant
reason for the inaction.1 50 Where Congress has acted, it has done
so on a limited scale, choosing to act like a state or locality in assum-
ing jurisdiction over only its most immediate domain, its own fed-
eral facilities. More commonly, however, in deference to the
growing evidence about ETS exposure, congressional members
propose measures to further investigate and assess the problem.
Measures endorsing further study, or at most, minimal and local
protection, are merely token gestures. Designed to placate the very
sources of the evil, the tobacco lobby and the smoking public, the
148. As reported from the subcommittee on Environment of the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, H.R. 1066, the Indoor Air Quality Act of 1991 authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to issue standards within two years pursuant to section 6 of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1990), to regulate indoor air quality "to
protect the health and safety of employees exposed to a variety of indoor air pollution in the
workplace." H.R. 1066, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 15 (1991). These standards are to include a
written program for indoor air pollution control, worksite assessments, and building perform-
ance studies designed to minimize workplace exposure to indoor air contaminants. Id. The
bill also acknowledges the relationship between indoor and outdoor air pollution, stating that
"the [EPA] Administrator shall, where appropriate, consider indoor human exposure to a
contaminant in the development of ambient air quality standards under section 109 and na-
tional emission standards for hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air
Act." Id. § 5(d). The bill would also establish an Office of Indoor Air Quality within the
Office of Air and Radiation at the EPA, whose function would be to coordinate and implement
indoor air quality efforts under federal statutes and programs. Id. § 11. The Senate compan-
ion bill proposes similar measures. S. 455, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
149. See Wall St. J., July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 5 (describing increased attention given to
workplace smoking restrictions in states where nonsmoker advocates are stronger than to-
bacco lobby). The strong tobacco lobby, headed by the Tobacco Institute, has been cited as a
predominant reason why the majority of smoking regulations to date emanate from state and
local government efforts. l
The Tobacco Institute has criticized the recent EPA passive smoke risk assessment as "spec-
ulation without an adequate scientific foundation." Boston Herald,June 26, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
It predicted that the EPA's scientific advisory board would not uphold the findings. Id. The
Institute asserted that the studies used by the EPA in the risk assessment ignored other factors
attributable to lung disease, such as occupation and lifestyle. Id Although the science advi-
sory board ultimately upheld the EPA's findings, the Tobacco Institute continues to challenge
the studies.
150. Note, Nonsmokers' Rights, 26J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 211, 211-12 (1984) (recognizing
"traditional acceptance" of tobacco smoking as reason for legislative stagnation in regulating
smoking).
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proposed measures only perpetuate the problem. 15'
3. Legislative impediments: An untenable excuse
While outdoor air constituents are vigorously regulated by the
EPA through the Clean Air Act,' 5 2 regulation of tobacco products,
and, consequently, their deadly emissions, is specifically proscribed
under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, the Controlled
Substances Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act-an unfortu-
nate legacy of the tobacco lobby.'53 Moreover, federal ETS control
has not even occurred under those laws which are not preclusive. '
5 4
Thus, while various federal agencies, including the Occupational
151. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing goal of tobacco lobby). The
position of the tobacco lobby, as gleaned from THE TOBACCO OBSERVER, the lobby's major
news periodical, is that smokers have a right to smoke free from regulation and that the rela-
tionship between smoking and disease cannot be proved, given the existing information.
Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 10-11.
152. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1988) (attempting "to protect and en-
hance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population").
153. Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(2) (1988); Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052(B) (1988); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1459(a)(1) (1988); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1988); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(iii). See generally Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra
note 17, at 941 (reviewing regulation of tobacco products).
154. See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 613 (stating that while Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (1988), requires EPA to regulate airborne pollutants and EPA has in fact regu-
lated constituents of ETS, such as carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide, EPA has inter-
preted statute to apply only to outdoor air). It is suggested that section 112 of the Act, which
calls for regulation of pollutants which may "reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase
in mortality or an increase in incapacitating reversible illness," should be construed to encom-
pass indoor air. Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 19. The EPA calls its limita-
tion to outdoor air an "historical interpretation." Id. at 19. As a result of this interpretation,
federal programs directed at controlling indoor air pollutants are limited to ad hoc, uncoordi-
nated efforts. Examples of this are asbestos and radon by the EPA and formaldehyde by the
Consumer Products Safety Commission. UNrrED STATES ENvrL. PROTEcTION AGENCY, I RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS ON INDOOR AIR QUALMv 1-2 (1989) (describing background of Clean Air
Act).
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act gives OSHA direct authority to regulate
ETS-type constituents, it has failed to do so. See supra note 1 I (discussing OSHA's recent
acknowledgment of ETS cancer risk). In 1989, Action on Smoking and Health filed suit
against OSHA in an attempt to oblige the agency to prohibit smoking in the workplace.
Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1991, at A13, col. 3. In response, OSHA announced plans to commence
information gathering to determine whether or not ETS should be regulated as a workplace
hazard. Id CharlesJames, an attorney of the United States Department of Labor, stated that
"[a] request for information is the first step in the process for evaluating workplace air quality
issues, including Environmental Tobacco Smoke, and determining whether the agency should
promulgate a standard." Id. On May 10, 1991, however, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia rejected ASH's petition that sought review of OSHA's decision not to issue an
emergency temporary standard banning tobacco smoking in the workplace. Action on Smok-
ing and Health v. OSHA, 59 U.S.L.W. 2728, 2728 (D.C.June 4, 1991) (No. 89-1656) (stating
that OSHA can authorize emergency standard only if it reasonably determines that "employ-
ees are exposed to grave danger" from toxic substance in workplace and emergency standard
is "necessary" to protect workers from that danger). The court further stated that "we be-
lieve that OSHA reasonably determined that it could not at this time sufficiently quantify the
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Safety and Health Administration, have current jurisdiction to act
upon the regulatory void, they have conspicuously failed to do so.1 55
Consequently, legislative and regulatory gaps remain, perpetuating
the current paucity of federal ETS control.
1 56
V. A SOLUTION TO THE PARADOXES
A. A Resolution of the Public Perception Paradox
The absence of federal ETS regulation epitomizes the Federal
Government's failure to regulate comparable risks consistently.
This regulatory paradox emanates in part from environmental pol-
icy priorities reflecting false societal perceptions of risk, rather than
scientific risk realities.1 57 Logically, the first step toward termina-
tion of this paradox of perception is to reconcile risk realities with
societal concern.' 58 The EPA recently recognized that the fulfill-
ment of these objectives is essential to a concomitant reconciliation
of relative risks with federal regulatory priorities. 159 Thus, the EPA
should first reformulate its budgetary priorities to better reflect risk
realities such as those from indoor air pollutants like ETS, and si-
multaneously educate the public about the foundation of its re-
vamped regulatory strategy. This two-tiered scheme will ensure
that limited EPA resources are utilized to provide maximum health
protection from the most dangerous environmental risks in a legiti-
mate and efficacious manner.
B. A Resolution of the Regulatory Paradox
The EPA should regulate environmental tobacco smoke for what
it is, a toxic air pollutant posing a cancerous health risk of magni-
tudes beyond the acceptable risk thresholds established by regula-
tory agencies.' 60 Section 112 of the Clean Air Act authorizes the
degree of risk associated with workplace exposure to ambient tobacco smoke to justify issuing
an emergency temporary standard." Id.
155. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (documenting popular support for
ETS regulation and describing state of current federal jurisdiction over indoor air pollution).
156. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (citing recent announcement by OSHA
that it will soon commence information gathering on ETS issue); supra notes 144-46 and ac-
companying text (discussing scope of congressional recognition of ETS hazard).
157. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 95 (discussing EPA reluctance to take ac-
tion concerning high risk of indoor air pollution).
158. See id. (identifying EPA inconsistencies in setting priorities, regarding public percep-
tion of risk and risk reality); id. at 95-100 (discussing factors such as involuntary nature of risk
that tend to engender public exaggeration of risk).
159. See REDUCING RISK, supra note 3, at 20, 24 (delineating budgetary realignment and
public education as two central components of policy reformulation effort in order to narrow
gap between public perception of risk and scientifically-substantiated risk reality).
160. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (comparing documented ETS cancer
risk with acceptable risk thresholds established by EPA).
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EPA to issue national uniform health-protective standards for life-
threatening stationary hazardous air pollution risks emanating from
the activities of others.' 61 ETS, like other hazardous air pollutants
delineated by Congress for EPA regulation, emanates from human
activity and presents an unacceptable involuntary risk to those ex-
posed. Unlike these outdoor air pollutants, however, ETS has not
been deemed ripe for regulation by Congress or EPA. 162
Ideally, environmental health risk abatement legislation and regu-
lation would rid society of the "moral evils" of all environmental
risk.' 63 Yet, economic, regulatory, and political realities and para-
doxes frequently impede the journey to this ideal end.164 For exam-
ple, Congress designed the original section 112 of the Clean Air Act
to protect the public from life-threatening toxic air pollution.1 6
5
EPA and the courts, however, interpret this provision to mean that
only toxic air pollutants presenting a "significant" risk to the public
demand regulation.' 66 Moreover, once a significant risk pollutant is
mitigated to an "acceptable" threshold, cost and technological
considerations become a justification for limiting additional risk
abatement activity.167 As previously discussed, the new section 112
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 adopts an analogous
approach. 16
8
Clearly, the threat from ETS is "significant" under the threshold
standards for toxic pollutants established to justify federal regula-
161. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative authority of
Clean Air Act and its regulatory scope).
162. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b) (Supp. 1991) (authorizing comprehensive regulation of
outdoor air, including 189 specified hazardous air pollutants); supra note 127 and accompany-
ing text (discussing gap in federal regulatory process for combatting indoor air pollution).
163. See Sagoff, Federal Pollution Control Law, supra note 27, at 24 (placing pollution control
legislation in "long tradition of humanitarian legislation intended to ameliorate man's inhu-
manity to man."); id. at 79 (describing regulatory control of toxic pollutants as standing
"squarely in the tradition of legislation that seeks to control and eliminate moral evils"); see
also Schroeder, supra note 28, at 505 (stating that many believe environmental regulations
impose values that should not be tempered by cost-benefit considerations).
164. See Sagoff, Federal Pollution Control Law, supra note 27, at 79 (stating that pollution
"must be tolerated, at least to some extent, if indispensable economic activity is to continue
and flourish").
165. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing EPA interpretation of section
112 that hazardous air pollutants should be reduced to "ample margin of safety to protect
public health").
166. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sanctioning EPA's interpre-
tation of section 112 to require reduction of significant risks only). But see Graham, supra note
73, at 108 (criticizing ambiguous and overambitious legislative language of section 112 as
source of EPA's reluctance to regulate cancer risks at no-threshold level); id. at 130 (discuss-
ing how some commentators interpret section 112 as rejecting cost considerations in risk
regulation).
167. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (citing National Resources Defense Council
and regulations from decision as well as justifications for de minimis risk analysis).
168. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of amended sec-
tion 112 of Clean Air Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (Supp. 1991).
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tory action. 169 Thus, ETS in the indoor environment should be con-
sidered a hazardous air pollution source under the Clean Air Act
with risks similar, if not greater, to those currently requiring mitiga-
tion through application of maximum available control technology
(MACT) under section 112 of the amended Clean Air Act. 170 Tech-
nology-based controls and ETS are incommensurates, however.
The MACT applicable to ETS in public indoor air is complete termi-
nation of the pollution source;' 7 ' ventilation mechanisms or struc-
tural alterations are costly and insufficient. 72
Moreover, without source termination, an "adequate margin of
safety" cannot realistically be ensured.' 73 ETS is potentially ubiqui-
tous in all indoor air spaces.' 74 Considering that the public spends
ninety percent of its day indoors, individuals may be exposed to it at
various and indeterminate times during the day. While the actual
ETS sources, the smokers, may fluctuate, the hazardous air constitu-
ents remain constant. Unlike many stationary outdoor air pollutants
such as smokestack emissions, ETS cannot be constantly monitored
due to its potential presence in all public places. Thus, a one in one
million (106) "safe" risk level cannot be ensured. 175 A national ban
169. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (examining parameters of acceptable
risk).
170. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d) (Supp. 1991) (requiring major sources of hazardous air
pollutants to be controlled to "the maximum degree of reduction in emissions ... that the
Administrator, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction...
determines is achievable"). Major sources are defined by the Act as stationary sources which
emit or have the potential to emit 10 tons per year of hazardous air pollutants into the ambi-
ent air. Id The "major source" requirement of 10 tons per year should not apply to ETS
emissions, given the potentially constant and indeterminate quantity of emissions. See id
§ 7412(a)(1) (authorizing the EPA Administrator to establish a "lesser quantity... for a major
source.., on the basis of the potency of the air pollutant, persistence, ... or other relevant
factors).
171. See A. BRODY & B. BRODY, supra note 111, at 119 (defining "public place" for purpose
of federal smoking ban as places of public accommodation, workplaces, businesses involved in
interstate commerce, and federally-financed buildings).
172. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 11, at 13 (recognizing inadequacy of ventila-
tion and physical separation measures).
173. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d), (f)(2) (Supp. 1991) (authorizing hazardous air pollutants
to be regulated under section 112 in a manner consistent with policy set forth in National
Resources Defense Council, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and in Agency's rulemaking on emis-
sions for benzene, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (1989)); id. (stating that Clean Air Act now establishes
safe level of exposure to pollutant by considering health factors prior to considering cost,
feasibility, and other factors by setting "ample margin of safety"); INVOLUNTARY SMOKING,
supra note 11, at 13 (quoting former Surgeon General of United States, C. Everett Koop, as
stating "the simple separation of smokers and nonsmokers within the same air space may
reduce, but does not eliminate, the exposure of nonsmokers to environmental tobacco
smoke").
174. See Repace, Risks of Passive Smoking, supra note 17, at 19 (discussing fact that over-
whelming majority of public spends its day in ETS contaminated atmosphere).
175. See id (describing passive smoke as "pandemic" in nature); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7412(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991) (establishing 10' risk level as threshold of acceptability for haz-
ardous air pollutants).
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on ETS pollution in areas of public access and employment, there-
fore, should be established under section 112 to minimize the risk
from outdoor hazardous air pollutants; only through complete ter-
mination of ETS emissions can "acceptable" levels of risk be
achieved. 176
Accordingly, Congress should enact the Clean Air Act Nonsmokers'
Protection Amendments, amending section 112 of the Clean Air Act to
include ETS as a delineated hazardous air pollutant, characterizing
public indoor environments as sources of ETS pollution, and com-
pelling the EPA to order and enforce a complete ban of ETS in all
public indoor environments. 177 EPA should implement the amend-
ments by declaring a national zero-level ETS emission standard in
public indoor air environments, proscribing smoking in all public
indoor premises.' 78 While enforcement responsibility would ini-
tially lie with the owners or operators of the public facility, a "Non-
smokers Protection Hotline" should be established by EPA to
receive grievances from citizens illegally subjected to ETS. EPA
should place enforcement officers at those facilities for which fre-
quent complaints are received. No smoking signs should also be
conspicuously posted in all regulated facilities, stating the ban and
outlining the details of the ETS hazard. The enforcement proce-
dures of section 113 of the Clean Air Act would also apply whereby
illegal smokers would be subject to the Act's criminal enforcement
provisions, as knowing emitters of hazardous air pollution.' 79
Clearly, the smoker, and not the facility, should be considered the
emission source for enforcement purposes. Only through com-
pletely prohibiting ETS can the EPA ensure that "an ample margin
of safety to protect the public health" from ETS exposure exists.' 8 0
Although an analogous restriction on outdoor pollutants would
go far beyond prudent cost-benefit analysis, a federal ban on ETS
176. See R. GOODIN, supra note 1, at 87-88 (recommending legislative smoking bans to
effect ETS protection). But see Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43 STAN. L. REv.
475, 486 (1991) (criticizing Goodin's scientific evidence-based rationale for no-smoking legis-
lation as unjustified).
177. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b) (Supp. 1991) (delineating list of hazardous air pollutants).
178. A "public" place, for purposes of the enactment, should be defined as all public and
private workplaces, all indoor spaces of businesses engaged in interstate commerce, and all
other indoor environments open to the general public, including entertainment facilities,
shopping areas, and medical treatment facilities.
179. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. 1991) (providing that "any person who know-
ingly violates ... section 7412 of this title... shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine
pursuant to title 18, or by imprisonment for not to exceed 5 years, or both"). While enforce-
ment will inevitably be challenging, recognition of the danger will encourage those exposed
to inform local authorities and EPA of violations.
180. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2) (Supp. 1991) (authorizing reduction of cancer risk from
hazardous air pollutants to levels below one in one million (106) where such levels cannot be
achieved through application of maximum achievable control technology).
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pollution in indoor public places would not for two reasons. First,
cost considerations justifying environmental pollution risk reduc-
tion, rather than risk elimination, are not applicable to ETS regula-
tion efforts because it is impossible to achieve acceptable levels of
ETS exposure in public areas. 181 Second, the risk source, the
smoker, is still free to smoke in the private home and the outdoor
environment.1 82 Indeed, tobacco smoke would not be banned, only
the public's indoor exposure to its deadly emissions. The resultant
federal action would protect the public on a national and uniform
level from an imperiling health risk, while eliminating the statutory
and regulatory paradox that defines the ETS risk today.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the point is moot. On the one hand, some may argue
that legislative and regulatory priority assessment and criticism are
futile and naive in the context of environmental law. These com-
mentators maintain that environmental protection is not the prod-
uct of scientific reality and amorphous mathematical risk
assessment, but rather of societal perception, democratic articula-
tion, and political response. Congressional legislation and EPA reg-
ulation must be primarily responsive to societal will, not alleged
scientific truth. For example, the first Earth Day in 1970 was the
product of mass appeal, not scientific revelation. After all, the risk
assessment process is imprecise and uncertain. If error is inevitable,
limited resources should be allocated to appease publicly-feared
risks first, and more significant risks later, if the two are
incongruous.
This rationale, however, cannot be accepted in light of the envi-
ronmental health risks confronting society today. Meaningful envi-
ronmental regulation demands a redirection of priorities and
resources focusing on risk protection. Certainly, the legitimacy of
such activity depends upon public awareness and acknowledgment
that current regulatory activity is often more cosmetic than effectual.
However, a reformulated societal consensus on environmental risk
priorities can only be developed through a Federal Government ini-
tiative to educate the public on health risks.
181. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 607
(1980) (declaring that "safe" does not mean "risk free"); see also supra note 18 and accompany-
ing text (discussing justifications for cost-benefit analysis and "significant" risk regulation).
182. Although risk from at-home exposure to ETS parallels those discussed, issues of pri-
vate home ETS regulation implicate constitutional privacy issues and are beyond the scope of
this Comment. See generally 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9 (noting that no risk assess-
ments have been performed for the health threat from ETS in outdoor ambient air).
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The dearth of federal ETS regulation illuminates the current state
of environmental protection. ETS presents a significant health risk
to the public that is substantiated by scientific evidence. The EPA,
the federal agency granted primary authority for protecting human
health from environmental pollutants, concurs that ETS is a signifi-
cant risk to the public health. Unlike risks of similar or lesser magni-
tude, however, ETS remains uncontrolled. Thus, the regulatory
paradox: the failure of federal regulatory and legislative bodies to
regulate ETS contradicts the risk regulation standards defining the
federal regulatory process. 83
To terminate the paradox, regulation of risks such as those im-
posed by ETS must result from objective scientific reality and logical
policy choices, not value-laden judgments.8s4 Indeed, internal EPA
review of its priorities and mission reflects a growing awareness
within the regulatory and scientific community that existing regula-
tory paradoxes must be addressed and resolved if legitimate and ef-
fective environmental protection is to be achieved. Therefore, the
EPA should ban ETS as a toxic air pollutant in all public areas to
make an involuntary health risk truly preventable.
183. See Thumbs on the Scales of Risk?, supra note 16 at G3, col. 3 (quoting commentary in
Science magazine: "[i]f current ill-advised regulatory levels continue to be imposed, the cost
of cleaning up phantom hazards will be in the hundreds of billions of dollars with minimal
benefits to human health. In the meantime, real hazards are not receiving adequate
attention").
184. See idl at G3, col. 3 (quoting former EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus).
Ruckelshaus stated that "risk assessment must be based on scientific evidence and scientific
consensus only. Nothing will erode public confidence faster than the suspicion that policy
considerations have been allowed to influence the assessment of risk." l
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